From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from stravinsky.debian.org (stravinsky.debian.org [82.195.75.108]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B0AE4ADD9D; Fri, 21 Aug 2026 14:04:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=82.195.75.108 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787321080; cv=none; b=o+9rxBOeAKg4q3+Qs9MhKAy8bt4Rx5MVZCglN3WtFGxsqetKsJ5mtPrtEiFa9oFz2zc20aauZmOGKqHAIPT+LpNM3PobYV/fhRmc4JuV7BI4MPR36TWXlYq9F/ga7IpP8Vip7cIoYHnyUWDWpcjse5qNi13VXtnaG4Xyb0OFv6A= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787321080; c=relaxed/simple; bh=iR8t9kGDFEgpSPkTUKFI/4CZI5l1bH00mWfBN17G0aE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=YONi6NL16/gdXjDJPPuvKLqezHUnDNogmIvkPsEfzAHNRcmttb8mJIJBxT7uRv1BslcCS//4WLV/j7fKPiA05A23EKzezzl9sPSx+Ogo8jn8eyJyIJeW7sGXA2XGNB61jCgoJJ5ms5X1LClu/23Js5NNyTmPqvlXI3ZhMr+ETV4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=debian.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=debian.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=debian.org header.i=@debian.org header.b=T7sUuy38; arc=none smtp.client-ip=82.195.75.108 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=debian.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=debian.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=debian.org header.i=@debian.org header.b="T7sUuy38" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=debian.org; s=smtpauto.stravinsky; h=X-Debian-User:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=SdBGGRg8n21wLsq1Rr/9aeWOWntBAs5V69fUplLxRqk=; b=T7sUuy381KVuQSt4ma4ewlJSTw e7l+OZDvXvcr8tEVVR9NJzHPlp2E5/WOGVam1eErJmCrIbBUSvoPajkqNgUanMiTlPkV6F6weqzsV UEPbfwuT9WOknpJvCqZSimfzcRZ+IM+6zQBfKHVV6CtFir+a2vmC0D5jhn8vp90zRMxqKdMenoKdW KDfG9PHMmg30GcbAW9e1gnuNmqWM5Bvx31mfdSwRPY406L1w5tISz5D68wGxzvQpdq1Mc2pDrOIfv gSdhdgyS1EDWs7VYqYGtri5BH1maCKBTVXMTkVfBUISBT5CACU3iLX0u9XD5FAAWn9JGN0EqV7EJy tJy0+N5g==; Received: from authenticated-user by stravinsky.debian.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_X25519__RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256__AES_256_GCM:256) (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1wxPrE-00BOLF-0L; Fri, 21 Aug 2026 14:04:32 +0000 Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:04:27 -0700 From: Breno Leitao To: Kiryl Shutsemau Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Ilias Apalodimas , Miaohe Lin , Naoya Horiguchi , Andrew Morton , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, rmikey@meta.com, riel@surriel.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, kernel-team@meta.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] efi: add the LINUX_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY configuration table Message-ID: References: <20260821-hwpoison-kho-v2-0-5743791e48e6@debian.org> <20260821-hwpoison-kho-v2-2-5743791e48e6@debian.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Debian-User: leitao On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 12:51:34PM +0100, Kiryl Shutsemau wrote: > On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 03:06:02AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig > > index 29e0729299f5b..69c0dc02bc112 100644 > > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig > > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig > > @@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ config EFI_COCO_SECRET > > virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn > > allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets. > > > > +config EFI_POISONED_MEMORY > > + bool "Carry hardware-poisoned pages across kexec" > > + depends on EFI_STUB && MEMORY_FAILURE && 64BIT > > + help > > + Record page frames that are hardware-poisoned while this kernel runs > > + into an EFI configuration table, and honor that table early on the > > + next kernel so a kexec does not hand known-bad RAM back out. > > + > > + If unsure, say N. > > + > > Do we want to make it conditional? Maybe just for everyone with EFI_STUB > && MEMORY_FAILURE? > > Where 64BIT limitation comes from? That simplifies a bit the maths for memory operations, and make them more digestible. Do we really care about it on non 64 bits platform?