From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 08:24:23 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <apgTQKnhwMyFdQcr@zenbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831195327.1282C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 07:53:26PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [Low] File descriptors leak on the error path in test_restrict_binprm_discard().
> --
>
> commit 7fa3010dd885254cc82b6aa2f6f254ee83a13717
> Author: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
>
> selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock
>
> This commit adds tests for LSM policy object kfuncs interacting with Landlock.
> It tests execution confinement, audit log flags, and concurrent application
> using a syscall program and BPF RCU lock management.
>
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_policy_landlock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_policy_landlock.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000000..9270b39f5e3a7
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_policy_landlock.c
> [ ... ]
> > +static void test_restrict_binprm_discard(void)
> > +{
> > + struct policy_test_env env;
> > + char garbage_path[] = "/tmp/lsm_policy_garbage_XXXXXX";
> > + int garbage_fd, pipe_fds[2];
> > + char buf = 0;
> > + pid_t pid;
> > +
> > + if (setup_env(&env))
> > + goto out;
> [ ... ]
> > + if (!ASSERT_OK(pipe(pipe_fds), "pipe"))
> > + goto out_unlink;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Cannot use spawn_exec_child(): the same process must test its
> > + * write access after the failed exec.
> > + */
> > + pid = fork();
> > + if (!ASSERT_GE(pid, 0, "fork"))
> > + goto out_unlink;
>
> [Severity: Low]
> Does this code leak the file descriptors created by pipe() if fork() fails?
>
> If fork() fails here, the code jumps directly to the out_unlink label, and it
> appears neither pipe_fds[0] nor pipe_fds[1] are closed before exiting the
> function.
>
> The spawn_exec_child() helper function introduced in this same commit properly
> closes both descriptors on fork failure. Should similar cleanup be added here?
>
Will fix.
I think that's sashiko's only nit for this patchset.
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831145858.3869191-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com
The BPF CI AI review bot didn't run on this since the patchset can't
based on a bpf tree until it catches up to the recent Landlock changes.
Justin
> --
> Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831145858.3869191-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com?part=14
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-02 12:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 14:58 [PATCH v2 00/15] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Justin Suess
2026-08-31 17:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-08-31 17:41 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-02 13:05 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-02 17:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-02 18:28 ` Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] lsm: Add the bprm_apply_policy_object LSM hook Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] lsm: Move the lsm_for_each_hook() macro to security/lsm.h Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_acquire kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_apply_bprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] lsm: Document the LSM policy object interface Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the LSM policy object kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] landlock: Free rulesets after an RCU grace period Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock Justin Suess
[not found] ` <20260831195327.1282C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
2026-09-02 12:24 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] landlock: Document the BPF policy interface Justin Suess
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