From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Daan De Meyer <daan@amutable.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Next Mailing List <linux-next@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: linux-next: manual merge of the security tree with the vfs-brauner tree
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 17:39:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <arPyrhpeEe8A3W3M@sirena.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <arPTSwCBIDM9uhRd@sirena.co.uk>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 22367 bytes --]
On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 03:25:31PM +0200, Mark Brown wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Today's linux-next merge of the security tree got conflicts in:
>
> include/linux/security.h
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>
> between commit:
>
> ad664d41535a5 ("fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass const mnt_idmap")
>
> from the vfs-brauner tree and commit:
>
> 16959c469f232 ("lsm: expose mount idmaps to inode hooks")
>
> from the security tree.
>
> I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
> is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
> conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
> is submitted for merging. You may also want to consider cooperating
> with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
> complex conflicts.
This resolution was not good, there were additional semantic conflicts
plus a bit of a mismerge. This is all rather messy, I've applied the
quickly hacked together fixup below but it's all concerningly large and
this probably needs some collaboration between the two trees.
From 3f3dca4e8d3b9acf6652dd0cc91122773568120e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:48:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] security: Fix up mismerge and additional semantic issues with
vfs-brauner
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 19 +++++++------------
include/linux/security.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------
security/apparmor/af_unix.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/file.c | 10 +++++-----
security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/net.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 12 ++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++--------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
12 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 597e965fd5d9e..ef16e5343e099 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -125,29 +125,24 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_symlink, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_symlink, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mkdir, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mkdir, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_rmdir, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mknod, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mknod, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_rename, struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_readlink, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu)
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-=======
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int mask)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
->>>>>>> security/next
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
@@ -194,7 +189,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setintegrity, const struct inode *inode,
enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value, size_t size)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
struct kernfs_node *kn)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, const struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d0d27b4260827..8b8d6b8b802f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -411,15 +411,15 @@ int security_inode_create(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode);
-int security_inode_link(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+int security_inode_link(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_symlink(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name);
-int security_inode_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_mkdir(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_mknod(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ int security_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode,
size_t size);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
struct kernfs_node *kn);
-int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
+int security_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_release(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_create(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_create(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode)
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static inline void
security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
{ }
-static inline int security_inode_link(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_link(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_symlink(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_mkdir(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
int mode)
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_mknod(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
int mode, dev_t dev)
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *n
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static inline int security_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
index b908e744818c9..de80561348fc4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static void update_peer_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx,
* boundaries. Otherwise cached info off file is sufficient
*/
int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
- const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
+ const char *op, u32 request, const struct file *file)
{
struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
struct sockaddr_un *addr, *peer_addr;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 3e74b613db325..305fdb341ddbb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct aa_label *label,
- struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+ struct aa_label *flabel, const struct file *file,
u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct aa_label *label,
- struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+ struct aa_label *flabel, const struct file *file,
u32 request, u32 denied)
{
int error;
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static bool __file_is_delegated(struct aa_label *obj_label)
return unconfined(obj_label);
}
-static bool __is_unix_file(struct file *file)
+static bool __is_unix_file(const struct file *file)
{
struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static bool __is_unix_file(struct file *file)
return false;
}
-static bool __unix_needs_revalidation(struct file *file, struct aa_label *label,
+static bool __unix_needs_revalidation(const struct file *file, struct aa_label *label,
u32 request)
{
struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static bool __unix_needs_revalidation(struct file *file, struct aa_label *label,
* Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
*/
int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
- struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct file *file,
u32 request, bool in_atomic)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
index 4a62e600d82b0..62e3269273eb7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname);
int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
- const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file);
+ const char *op, u32 request, const struct file *file);
#endif /* __AA_AF_UNIX_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 1614c07fc53ee..d69a0611a981e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct path;
AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
-static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file)
+static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(const struct file *file)
{
return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
}
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
struct dentry *new_dentry);
int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
- struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct file *file,
u32 request, bool in_atomic);
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 375341929cb65..e387b50920b3b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request, const struct sock *sk);
int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request,
- struct file *file);
+ const struct file *file);
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
u32 secid, const struct sock *sk);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index c73681d820a06..9d572cf8486b2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
}
-static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+static int common_file_perm(const char *op, const struct file *file, u32 mask)
{
struct aa_label *label;
bool needput;
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
}
-static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int apparmor_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask)
{
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index a333e6aff9262..6048e3c5533d7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, const struct sock *sk)
int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
- const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
+ const char *op, u32 request, const struct file *file)
{
struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 09b0af1c0d656..da8d48cd0a2a4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1697,7 +1697,7 @@ void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_link(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+int security_inode_link(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_symlink(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
@@ -1752,7 +1752,7 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_mkdir(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
@@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+int security_inode_mknod(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
@@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+int security_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask)
{
return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index eb31241047abf..88f3a5858c2a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3110,13 +3110,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
&ad);
}
-static int selinux_inode_create(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+static int selinux_inode_create(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
}
-static int selinux_inode_link(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+static int selinux_inode_link(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
@@ -3127,13 +3127,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
}
-static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
}
-static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
{
return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
@@ -3144,7 +3144,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
@@ -3284,7 +3284,7 @@ static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec,
* Check if the current task is allowed to access @inode according to
* @requested. Returns 0 if allowed, negative values otherwise.
*/
-static int selinux_inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static int selinux_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int requested)
{
int mask;
@@ -3842,7 +3842,7 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
/* file security operations */
-static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -3855,7 +3855,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
}
-static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int selinux_file_permission(const struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 07183e4606fc0..28a8e12603cec 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_link(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+static int smack_inode_link(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct smack_known *isp;
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
+static int smack_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask)
{
struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
--
2.47.3
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-23 15:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-23 13:25 Mark Brown
2026-09-23 15:39 ` Mark Brown [this message]
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2026-09-14 11:48 Mark Brown
2026-09-14 13:18 ` Jori Koolstra
2026-04-06 14:05 Mark Brown
2024-09-10 3:27 Stephen Rothwell
2024-09-10 19:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-20 3:31 Stephen Rothwell
2023-11-20 21:09 ` Paul Moore
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