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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, luto@kernel.org,
	kees@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] entry: Fix seccomp bypass after ptrace with TSYNC
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 11:21:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <as9Jqi5BvSZWfxj8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260713025712.416366-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com>

On 07/13, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>
> Sashiko review pointed out the following issue.
>
> If a thread is stopped in syscall_trace_enter() for ptrace, another
> thread can install a seccomp filter with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
> (e.g., via seccomp_attach_filter()). This will successfully set
> SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP on the stopped thread, but syscall_trace_enter()
> evaluates a cached 'work' variable sampled on entry. Consequently,
> the subsequent check for SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP misses the newly
> assigned flag, and the filter is silently bypassed.
>
> This race condition could allow an unprivileged process to execute
> a prohibited system call (e.g., execve) that the newly installed filter
> was intended to block, especially since the tracer might have modified
> the system call number during the ptrace stop.
>
> Fix this by re-reading the syscall_work flags after ptrace handling,
> so that any new SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP flag set by another thread via
> TSYNC during the ptrace stop is observed before the subsequent
> seccomp check.

I agree with this patch, but SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC can also happen
after syscall_trace_enter() re-reads ->syscall_work ?

And this race is possible even without ptrace, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
from another thread can happen after syscall_enter_from_user_mode_work()
reads ->syscall_work ?

I think we don't really care, but I don't understand the security concerns.
If debugger controls the process before it installs the seccomp filters, it
can simply nack sys_seccomp().

In short, does CVE-2026-89603 make real sense?

Oleg.

> --- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
> +++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
> @@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
>  		if (!arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs) ||
>  		    (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_EMU))
>  			return -1L;
> +
> +		/* ptrace might have changed work flags */
> +		work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->syscall_work);
>  	}
>
>  	/* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes. */
> --
> 2.34.1
>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-14  9:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-13  2:57 Jinjie Ruan
2026-07-14  7:36 ` Jinjie Ruan
2026-07-14 14:40 ` [tip: core/entry] " tip-bot2 for Jinjie Ruan
2026-10-14  9:21 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2026-10-15 16:16   ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook

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