mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: "Jérémy Jean" <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] wireguard: noise: reject responses for replaced initiations
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 23:18:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <asQUKTOiEn6GB5sy@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261005203555.3552816-2-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>

Hi,

On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 08:35:55PM +0000, Jérémy Jean wrote:
> WireGuard can accept an old handshake response after starting a new
> handshake. This reinstalls old keys and resets transport counters and
> replay state, enabling nonce reuse, replay and packet forgery. This
> breaks confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
> 
> Compare ephemeral secrets under the write lock to reject responses for
> replaced initiations.
> 
> Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
> ---
>  drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 8 +++++---
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
> index 9c0a09bf6c95..88cc9acc7dc7 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
> @@ -784,10 +784,12 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
>  
>  	/* Success! Copy everything to peer */
>  	down_write(&handshake->lock);
> -	/* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we
> -	 * have an exclusive lock.
> +	/* Check that this is still the initiation we authenticated against,
> +	 * while we have an exclusive lock.
>  	 */
> -	if (handshake->state != state) {
> +	if (handshake->state != state ||
> +	    crypto_memneq(handshake->ephemeral_private, ephemeral_private,
> +			  NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)) {
>  		up_write(&handshake->lock);
>  		goto fail;
>  	}

Could you describe the flow that you think causes a bug? Trying
to recreate your mental model. Something like this?

== thread 1 ==

	down_read(&handshake->lock);
	state = handshake->state;
	memcpy(hash, handshake->hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
	memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
	memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private,
	       NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
	memcpy(preshared_key, handshake->preshared_key,
	       NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
	up_read(&handshake->lock);

	if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION)
		goto fail;

	/* e */
	message_ephemeral(e, src->unencrypted_ephemeral, chaining_key, hash);

	/* ee */
	if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, ephemeral_private, e))
		goto fail;

	/* se */
	if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, wg->static_identity.static_private, e))
		goto fail;

	/* psk */
	mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, preshared_key);

	/* {} */
	if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing,
			     sizeof(src->encrypted_nothing), key, hash))
		goto fail;

== thread 2 ==

	down_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock);
	down_write(&handshake->lock);

	if (unlikely(!handshake->static_identity->has_identity))
		goto out;

	dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION);

	handshake_init(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash,
		       handshake->remote_static);

	/* e */
	curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private);
	if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
					handshake->ephemeral_private))
		goto out;
	message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
			  dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key,
			  handshake->hash);

	/* es */
	if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, handshake->ephemeral_private,
		    handshake->remote_static))
		goto out;

	/* s */
	message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_static,
			handshake->static_identity->static_public,
			NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash);

	/* ss */
	if (!mix_precomputed_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key,
				handshake->precomputed_static_static))
		goto out;

	/* {t} */
	tai64n_now(timestamp);
	message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_timestamp, timestamp,
			NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key, handshake->hash);

	dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert(
		handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
		&handshake->entry);

	handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION;
	ret = true;

out:
	up_write(&handshake->lock);
	up_read(&handshake->static_identity->lock);

== thread 1 ==

	down_write(&handshake->lock);
	/* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we
	 * have an exclusive lock.
	 */
	if (handshake->state != state) {
		up_write(&handshake->lock);
		goto fail;
	}
	memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
	memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
	memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
	handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index;
	handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
	up_write(&handshake->lock);
	ret_peer = peer;
	goto out;

And now begin_session is called on the older completed handshake rather
than the half-completed newer handshake?

Or did you see some other flow?

Let me know.

Thanks,
Jason

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-05 21:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-05 20:35 Jérémy Jean
2026-10-05 20:43 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-10-05 21:18 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2026-10-06  7:53   ` Jason A. Donenfeld

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=asQUKTOiEn6GB5sy@zx2c4.com \
    --to=jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr \
    --cc=andrew+netdev@lunn.ch \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®