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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rodolfo Giometti" <giometti@enneenne.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
	"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
	"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:37:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <av5EyVHnNzT27dyK@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <650f89ef-9745-4f75-b254-80fa5ac4773d@gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
> > This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
> > use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
> > and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
> > KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
> 
> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
> this encourages very poor practices.  AES-GCM even allows userspace
> to extract the secret authentication key.
> 
> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC.  Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
> the key is ephemeral.
> 
> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either.  If you allow encrypting
> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce.  Nonce reuse leaks the
> authentication key and allows forgeries.  Using random nonces isn't
> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
> and the API can't enforce that limit.
> 
> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
> at random for each encryption without any problems.
> 
> - XAES-256-GCM
> - XChaCha20-Poly1305
> - AEGIS-256
> 
> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
> leaking if two plaintexts are equal.  This happens whenever there is
> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.

The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.

At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
the potential user base.

The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.

And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
the break down of what is wrong here.

If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.

These are the main topics what I would focus on.

> -- 
> Sincerely,
> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

Br, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19  0:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:04 Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19  0:25   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:55     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-19  0:43     ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  1:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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