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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
Cc: "Baek Kyu, Kim" <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes (Arm)" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:36:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <av6m4wU7iDOGviIa@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45ce0b42-d45a-44e3-b300-607989e618c5@kernel.org>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:59:57PM +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 10/30/26 16:24, Baek Kyu, Kim wrote:
> > A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
> > opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
> > alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
> > release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
> > same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.
> > 
> > Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
> > after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
> > lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages. Let
> > iput() handle file-creation failures and tolerate an inode with no private
> > state.

I don't like the last part, see below.

> > Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
> > Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>
> 
> Lorenzo, Mike, this problem seems real to me. Can you take a look?

Yep, it's real and the fix is correct.
 
> > ---
> > On an arm64 QEMU guest with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, an O_PATH reference
> > retained two secretmem pages. The baseline dropped the charge to zero and
> > allowed a further one-page fault; the patch kept both pages charged and
> > rejected that fault until the last path reference closed. The Image
> > was built with KASAN and lockdep. Hibernation, other architectures,
> > and long-running concurrency were not tested.
> > 
> >  mm/secretmem.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
> >  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> > index 384f5cfc457f..fa8be360bd2a 100644
> > --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> > +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> > @@ -185,18 +185,14 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
> >  {
> >  	struct secretmem_inode_state *state = inode->i_private;
> >  
> > +	if (!state)
> > +		return;
> > +

Its really not obvious how we can get here with state == NULL. 

And since it is needed only for error path in secretmem_file_create(), I
suggest rearranging the initialization so that we never get here with NULL
state. 
Allocate the state before creating the inode and adjust error handling in
secretmem_file_create() so that we always get to iput with valid i_private.


> >  	secretmem_unaccount_all_folios(state);
> >  	free_uid(state->user);
> >  	kfree(state);
> >  	inode->i_private = NULL;
> > -}
> > -
> > @@ -296,7 +292,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> >  				 O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE, &secretmem_fops);
> >  	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> >  		err = PTR_ERR(file);
> > -		goto err_free_priv;
> > +		goto err_free_inode;
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
> > @@ -309,11 +305,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> >  	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
> >  	inode->i_size = 0;
> >  
> > -	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
> > -
> >  	return file;
> > -err_free_priv:
> > -	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> >  err_free_inode:
> >  	iput(inode);
> >  	return ERR_PTR(err);
> > @@ -335,6 +327,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
> >  	return FD_ADD(flags & O_CLOEXEC, secretmem_file_create(flags));
> >  }

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19  7:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-30 15:24 Baek Kyu, Kim
2026-11-18 22:59 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19  7:36   ` Mike Rapoport [this message]

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