From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794576581; b=CKWuHjgqfQc3tuUo2xU0CTper+IK92tLFSA/M8bXNQoPMfzrOdUB7jF8YZC1zAWto0l6 YJop8hNsKk4gCHLHz5vuTSgA+ThYcHN5dr+JIB7O90Vt4LxoIXFXq5GSupADHLqfGouuN +WQir7MEWQTmvBzGJoYkn0lIgELZRMMQB3NAeYTt/8SDwrTJsmTNnEWpy5DXem+cv7Wmf QLrRm02/2Fj75GDeMLVdHt6noXuC/9RlAFNUxupU175Nns9n+WFfQ/MHW7uaYxsdMNy66 41dUSPa54mSdeT9qCLVDGDIJ7dXWdFtG1WYcfF2rlShejD7rMwSiDys9468wcflNIcQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794576581; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=mRkP4vCBEhwDwIItCpqDxdPiuMhmAWoHVv8GMq0ZNVE=; b=P+7NKdQl20rjq4XHG5vAAsm/fiZBmSKuMI+9sG4xTew8aouN/awRj82ecfT7j2DExaUU rEqobW/hB2bb2bjSClYqHrvupVPDu5kORF+WZj0vqyaebXTO10v8KynJzXQOSFrJMegeK 0NMAcdpZ6u6OdVl680YCmtmVT5vA7IasPmRonp+kj69eXGPGgpxoi45CcNLHHBI6LrPsG 5mN2F9iijwT8u9Cn4S2tfl+v4juyiE/sIhjh/G3hzqbUXyGM32wSCu/ZwDn2i8v+5HIId zm4lbt4hTAOVB9gz80MIMRDj6lqnAUXqRDQfOgp0m52U7+Vq1ayy8tG6hXmaNBrmYFg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=DlfnLIMw; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96AEB606A332 for ; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:29:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=DlfnLIMw Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 906B01F000C4; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:29:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794576581; bh=mRkP4vCBEhwDwIItCpqDxdPiuMhmAWoHVv8GMq0ZNVE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=DlfnLIMwN2cGm60Lm5wvzQwZPQSEoJ1NEOBxiV0pRcJDHB8KOEVBRTEIB+jq3xMKL aDeuyD3r6ySM9HG1mLuVemktGLPh8HegaxK8cp/GJjEtYRLiFmIUh1F5zvbCNHYpti DOyEcPdNXgOP2mpJA5R5VVU5v4W3RJ8CKSibz03YjWDqImb6iqYQMD6CzqOxphqhpg 5egjD/b5OOUzbuG5LApa10dWDUuQgPNQbQiqoQxaoAgBI3G6Mler/U67nVvm+Y9G0d QXLrvPoB1HgL9jXtKAoNwh7Fvo0DiF44ytwUtEUCAM6uhRlwUXeBYxq6BHcnbFveRY l1hdk8ixRzYig== Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:29:35 +0000 From: Will Deacon To: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Zhao Gongyi , catalin.marinas@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, ruanjinjie@huawei.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kees@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: ptrace: don't warn on missing siginfo in a group-stop Message-ID: References: <20261023110710.10145-1-zhaogongyi@bytedance.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Mon, Nov 09, 2026 at 02:43:22PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote: > On 11/04, Will Deacon wrote: > > > > > > @@ -588,7 +584,7 @@ static void update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(struct task_struct *target) > > > > * Don't update orig_x0 for a syscall-exit-stop, as x0 now contains the > > > > * return value of the system call. > > > > */ > > > > - if ((info->si_code & ~0x80) == SIGTRAP && > > > > + if (info && (info->si_code & ~0x80) == SIGTRAP && > > > > target->ptrace_message == PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_EXIT) { > > > > return; > > > > > > LGTM, but I don't understand this arm-specific code. > > > > Welcome to the club :) > > Thank you ;) > > > The original rationale is described in e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: > > Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates"), so hopefully that > > helps to set the scene. > > [...snip...] > > Thanks for your explanations. Yes, I tried to read that and other commits. > The only result is that I've managed to convinced myself that more or less > I understand why 88b839ce497c and 5a87e8c7f3702 make sense. > > > So that's the mess we're in and I'm all ears if there's a cleaner way to > > sort it out without breaking anything that relies on the fragile semantics > > we already have. > > No, I can't suggest anything better. I think your patches and the fix from > Zhao are fine. > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Now the question... > > So we had CVE-2026-68171 and then it was rejected: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2026081123-REJECTED-f1f0@gregkh/ > > Now we have another one, CVE-2026-90347 > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2026091703-CVE-2026-90347-6f2c@gregkh/ > > Why? > > To me the problem looks minor (security wise). Yes, a malicious debugger can > fool seccomp. So what? What is the real problem from the scurity perspective? I think the security rationale probably goes back to a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace") so you'd need to ask Kees! I suspect that some environments (Android?) don't want the tracer to be able to execute arbitrary system calls in the context of the tracee. Will