From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794831597; b=ccwLVwXTqF8Mdg1QobIikzoef+NHtjQESsf+thHEA0UqzdSMZDjUUmoS/TlA1B0VvQHZ Rh4940vIJsyrIXAphfQVwdstTJECve5lHAXNb66PqUCqLt3nF4C/72FDucHB+fpH8SXyA /vZl8aXiaifGgwyG1cAToDXHO50jgNSvSOnuJ+/9ogIIjfgNhr9+jugUT7IIsSnobuz+l JqGhsw90iCDGZBEMv0Z1RFSeFs3/GHUJmi+lhbA0ai9C2svRe9LLz/B0HgFhajufSQi2v kvrMSed9SBBj4GCbLjxpCI6Aawqeipp28d9Upsm+KMvV+keblEjsheeNKPEVSMd4hxw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794831597; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=Y+b7pepc+bqSJnjvX8gOa7j05vvfbGVSW+Ko5NDA4NQ=; b=iyKd4TNgdnpQTCSvUdUS9Cc8QOaHzFwvmP6HAJPgi8fI0MLAJMs4Lh47/Kw6EXdTa7KZ LU/JTPXIfwWw5IvfAbw/YhdT52u6qqaD+BfLuPntW3ORrY4Y2r2O9Z+ww9CxTDX0FWme4 0/bOdbXxSjdF5Gtg7vVjErg5lXQ0OOZ/lZZRiKXGjIa+WX03okMrtnVl6E9jugYOLljhJ Z3lzkdeMMz5bVzPbKPZEhI7tXZegnEMMRf6fFnZsudfS9wzNgQacWPEAWhCaursgbUd5N 9sGEdEmTZM31oF/FOwVOPm4JkyMgu53Ms6WrwXgOw2yO00wXZ8F7uNw7BRY0TDrPKVw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=h6i2kbJu; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 77D5E606A323 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:19:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=h6i2kbJu Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 335D81F000C4; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:19:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794831597; bh=Y+b7pepc+bqSJnjvX8gOa7j05vvfbGVSW+Ko5NDA4NQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=h6i2kbJuFcncsmN96i+B4eX/8pFwpz8E8Mj0REJTflzdzEb762gWULzIIoik2F4KM pj78evRrW48pcJRQuHXSpbctZ6lrijH0BxBJIdQvPf5MKD7SsQpFX+jvHSBi6ijBro bn2NqV23Kd9e5AK9NYaISlCfV3uL09YyX1FyxW8VPfRKrZDmxd7oU1kkqtQKUgnzlo lzWossq90I4NOU9bLdEdu1jKUGxcm8uqOZGYj3WRs/kz0ksSRQH8Ej0avNY3Lmzz08 MaPZKqiAVbboL/9T+JNNSRHEdDUnMEgRN7Q8M16NsmWdo/UDBI8ltiHE50MdGVPSQs rZGCww+HqQJQQ== Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:59:42 +0800 From: Jisheng Zhang To: Zong Li , ivanrwcm25@gmail.com Cc: pjw@kernel.org, palmer@dabbelt.com, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, alex@ghiti.fr, debug@rivosinc.com, samuel.holland@sifive.com, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Greentime Hu Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: usercfi: Don't inherit parent shadow stack for user workers Message-ID: References: <20261116032558.130928-1-zong.li@sifive.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20261116032558.130928-1-zong.li@sifive.com> On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 07:25:58PM -0800, Zong Li wrote: > User-space background workers created through the copy_thread() args->fn > path (such as io_uring io-wq/SQPOLL threads and vhost workers) share the > parent's memory space (CLONE_VM) but never return to userspace. > > Currently, these workers inherit the parent's user_cfi_state bookkeeping > via dup_task_struct() (e.g., enabling shadow stack and pointing to the > parent's live shadow stack base). When such a worker exits, mm_release() > invokes shstk_release(), which incorrectly executes vm_munmap() on the > parent's active user shadow stack. This triggers a fatal SIGSEGV > (SEGV_MAPERR followed by SI_KERNEL) in the parent process during its next > function return check (sspopchk). > > Fix this by explicitly clearing the inherited shadow stack bookkeeping > (setting base and active state to 0) in the user worker branch of > copy_thread(). + Ivan, I think Ivan has fixed this issue in https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20261028154315.1272705-3-ivanrwcm25@gmail.com/ Besides the issue, he also fixed another bug in riscv. The only difference is whether set_active_shstk(p, 0) is needed or not. And in the same series, a selftest is also added. So IMHO, we'd better take Ivan's version. Just FYI, arm64 has merged the fixes into linux-7.4-rc3 > > Fixes: 61a0200211d3 ("riscv: Implement arch-agnostic shadow stack prctls") > > Co-developed-by: Greentime Hu > Signed-off-by: Greentime Hu > Signed-off-by: Zong Li > --- > arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 9 +++++++++ > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > index 34c1d498d1ca..4bc95acc5462 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > @@ -261,6 +261,15 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) > p->thread.s[0] = (unsigned long)args->fn; > p->thread.s[1] = (unsigned long)args->fn_arg; > p->thread.ra = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork_kernel_asm; > + > + /* > + * User workers (io_uring io-wq/SQPOLL, vhost) share the parent's mm > + * but never return to userspace. Don't inherit the parent's shadow > + * stack bookkeeping, otherwise shstk_release() on their exit would > + * vm_munmap() the parent's live shadow stack. > + */ > + set_shstk_base(p, 0, 0); > + set_active_shstk(p, 0); > } else { > /* allocate new shadow stack if needed. In case of CLONE_VM we have to */ > ssp = shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, args); > -- > 2.43.7 > > > _______________________________________________ > linux-riscv mailing list > linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv