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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/16] KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 11:10:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b0148465-37ae-15c0-9520-8061c7983002@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191114183453.GI24045@linux.intel.com>

On 14/11/19 19:34, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 08:16:22AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 12:51:01PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> On 22/10/19 02:08, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> Remove the code to initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR when KVM is
>>>> loaded now that the MSR is initialized during boot on all CPUs that
>>>> support VMX, i.e. can possibly load kvm_intel.
>>>>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++-------------------------
>>>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> I am still not sure about this...  Enabling VMX is adding a possible
>>> attack vector for the kernel, we should not do it unless we plan to do a
>>> VMXON.
>>
>> An attacker would need arbitrary cpl0 access to toggle CR4.VMXE and do
>> VMXON (and VMLAUNCH), would an extra WRMSR really slow them down?
>>
>> And practically speaking, how often do you encounter systems whose
>> firmware leaves IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL unlocked?

I honestly don't know... always on nested virtualization probably
doesn't count as an answer. :)

From a totally abstract point of view I like the idea of KVM being an
independent driver and thus the only place that touches VMX stuff
(including the relevant bit in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL).  But I understand
that this doesn't really make any concrete difference, so I guess you
can go ahead with this.

>>> Why is it so important to operate with locked
>>> IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL (so that KVM can enable VMX and the kernel can
>>> still enable SGX if desired).
>>
>> For simplicity.  The alternative that comes to mind is to compute the
>> desired MSR value and write/lock the MSR on demand, e.g. add a sequence
>> similar to KVM's hardware_enable_all() for SGX, but that's a fair amount
>> of complexity for marginal benefit (IMO).
>>
>> If a user really doesn't want VMX enabled, they can clear the feature bit
>> via the clearcpuid kernel param. 
>>
>> That being said, enabling VMX in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL if and only if
>> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) is true would be an easy enhancement.
> 
> Paolo, any follow up thoughts on this approach?

Yes, that would be a simple enhancement, useful at least for
documentation purpose.

Paolo


  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-15 10:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-21 23:46 [PATCH v2 00/16] x86/cpu: Clean up handling of VMX features Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR at boot Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 15:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:56 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/mce: WARN once if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is left unlocked Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 14:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/centaur: Use common IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR initialization Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/zhaoxin: " Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 10:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-22 15:16     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-14 18:34       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:10         ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2019-10-25 16:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 16:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 18:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:05       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-15 10:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-15 15:34           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 15:39             ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX feature flag to query BIOS enabling Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibility Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] x86/vmx: Introduce VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] x86/cpu: Detect VMX features on Intel, Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] x86/cpu: Print VMX flags in /proc/cpuinfo using VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] x86/cpufeatures: Drop synthetic VMX feature flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX_FEATURE_* flags to define VMCS control bits Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:09 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up synthetic virtualization flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:12 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] perf/x86: Provide stubs of KVM helpers for non-Intel CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:12 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson

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