From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, gary.hook@amd.com, erdemaktas@google.com,
rientjes@google.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, bsd@redhat.com,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] crypto: ccp: use file mode for sev ioctl permissions
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 09:37:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b037d70f-c23f-72d6-3866-57cb1e501eba@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200306172010.1213899-2-ckuehl@redhat.com>
On 3/6/20 11:20 AM, Connor Kuehl wrote:
> Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user,
> check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that
> can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access
> control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user
> or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them
> to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions.
>
> For example:
>
> chown root:root /dev/sev
> chmod 600 /dev/sev
> setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev
> setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev
>
> In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to
> perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state).
> Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not
> modify the platform state.
>
> This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file
> descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute
> ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file
> descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to
> modify the platform state.
>
> This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by
> the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to
> /dev/sev.
>
> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++----------------
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
thanks
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-10 14:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-06 17:20 [PATCH 0/1] " Connor Kuehl
2020-03-06 17:20 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Connor Kuehl
2020-03-08 21:54 ` David Rientjes
2020-03-09 14:03 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-03-10 0:43 ` David Rientjes
2020-03-10 14:37 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2020-03-10 14:45 ` Bandan Das
2020-03-10 19:02 ` David Rientjes
2020-03-10 19:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-03-12 12:40 ` Herbert Xu
2020-03-06 20:48 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Nathaniel McCallum
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