From: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Johannes Erdfelt <johannes@erdfelt.com>
Cc: "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Jon Grimm <Jon.Grimm@amd.com>,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
patrick.colp@oracle.com, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/microcode: Add an option to reload microcode even if revision is unchanged
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2019 22:48:00 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b0b0a1c0-979d-cc54-38e2-d37522aab351@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1909062237580.1902@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
La 07.09.2019 00:16, Thomas Gleixner a scris:
> On Fri, 6 Sep 2019, Johannes Erdfelt wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 06, 2019, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
>>> What your customers are asking for is a receipe for disaster. They can
>>> check the safety of late loading forever, it will not magically become safe
>>> because they do so.
>>>
>>> If you want late loading, then the whole approach needs to be reworked from
>>> ground up. You need to make sure that all CPUs are in a safe state,
>>> i.e. where switching of CPU feature bits of all sorts can be done with the
>>> guarantee that no CPU will return to the wrong code path after coming out
>>> of safe state and that any kernel internal state which depends on the
>>> previous set of CPU feature bits has been mopped up and switched over
>>> before CPUs are released.
>>
>> You say that switching of CPU feature bits is problematic, but adding
>> new features should result only in a warning ("x86/CPU: CPU features
>> have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.").
>>
>> Removing a CPU feature bit could be problematic. Other than HLE being
>> removed on Haswell (which the kernel shouldn't use anyway), have there
>> been any other cases?
>>
>> I ask because we have successfully used late microcode loading on tens
>> of thousands of hosts. I'm a bit worried to see that there is a push to
>> remove a feature that we currently rely on.
>
> The point is that you know what's on stake so you can evaluate precisely
> upfront whether that works or not and you have experienced kernel engineers
> on staff who can tell you which kind of ucode change is going to explode in
> your face and which on does not.
>
> So it's the special case of a large cloud company with experts on staff.
>
> Now map that to the average user/sysadmin. If we proliferate this, then the
> inevitable consequence will be that those people read about how great that
> is and how it made your customers happy yadayadayada. Now they go and do
> the same thing and guess what happens? It explodes in their face, they send
> bug reports and someone else will send lousy patches to paper over the
> problem. None of this ends on your desk.
>
> Yes you can surely argue that if you give people a gun then they can shoot
> themself into their foot. But in that case it's a irresponsible argument
> which just put's your interest above the general rule of not offering
> things which are bound to break in all flavours of wreckage especially in
> the hard to diagnose way.
>
> So if we want to do late microcode loading in a sane way then there are
> only a few options and none of them exist today:
>
> 1) Micro-code contains a description of CPUID bits which are going to be
> exposed after the load. Then the kernel can sanity check whether this
> changes anything relevant or not. If there is a relevant change it can
> reject the load and tell the admin that a reboot is required.
>
> 2) Rework CPUID feature handling so that it can reevaluate and reconfigure
> the running system safely. There are a lot of things you need for that:
>
> A) Introduce a safe state for CPUs to reach which guarantees that none
> of the CPUs will return from that state via a code path which
> depends on previous state and might now go the other route with data
> on the stack which only fits the previous configuration.
>
> B) Make all the cpufeature thingies run time switchable. That means
> that you need to keep quite some code around which is currently init
> only. That also means that you have to provide backout code for
> things which set up data corresponding to cpu feature bits and so
> forth.
>
> So #2 might be finished in about 20 years from now with the result that
> some of the code pathes might simply still have a
>
> if (cpufeature_changed())
> panic();
>
> because there are things which you cannot back out. So the only sane
> solution is to panic. Which is not a solution as it would be much more sane
> to prevent late loading upfront and force people to reboot proper.
>
> Now #1 is actually a sensible and feasible solution which can be pulled off
> in a reasonably short time frame, avoids all the bound to be ugly and
> failure laden attempts of fixing late loading completely and provides a
> usable and safe solution for joe user, jack admin and the super experts at
> big-cloud corporate.
>
> That is not requiring any new format of microcode payload, as this can be
> nicely done as a metadata package which comes with the microcode
> payload. So you get the following backwards compatible states:
>
> Kernel metadata result
>
> old don't care refuse late load
>
> new No refuse late load
>
> new Yes decide based on metadata
>
> Thoughts?
Internally, we have fix-up multiple corner cases about the late
microcode loading. We have written some code to handle new features
showing up but we know they are a bunch of hacks (for sure it lacks of
different checks that needs to be done before using the new features). I
am going to take Thomas' suggestion and work on an RFC series.
Thank you,
Mihai Carabas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-19 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-29 5:33 Ashok Raj
2019-08-29 5:38 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-08-29 6:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 13:02 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-03 16:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-04 22:06 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2019-09-04 22:12 ` Boris Petkov
2019-09-05 0:21 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-05 7:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-05 10:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-05 19:40 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-05 19:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-05 20:20 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-05 21:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-05 22:27 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-06 7:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-06 12:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-06 14:40 ` Johannes Erdfelt
2019-09-06 15:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-06 15:46 ` Johannes Erdfelt
2019-09-06 16:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-06 16:43 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-09-06 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-06 16:52 ` Johannes Erdfelt
2019-09-06 17:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-06 21:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-07 0:33 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-07 10:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-16 10:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-17 0:31 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-17 6:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-17 6:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-17 14:29 ` Raj, Ashok
2019-09-19 19:48 ` Mihai Carabas [this message]
2019-09-06 16:55 ` Raj, Ashok
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