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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 14:22:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b16a8882-4e88-0340-84b4-0fd2f8797206@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925001832.18322-17-keescook@chromium.org>

On 09/24/2018 05:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Before now, all the LSMs that did not specify an "enable" variable in their
> struct lsm_info were considered enabled by default. This prepares to make
> LSM enabling more explicit. For all LSMs without an explicit "enable"
> variable, a hard-coded storage location is chosen, and all LSMs without
> an external "enable" state have their state explicitly set to "enabled".
> 
> This code appears more complex than it needs to be (comma-separated
> list parsing and "set" function parameter) because its use will be
> expanded on in the following patches to provide more explicit enabling.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>


Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  security/security.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 056b36cf6245..a8107d54b3d3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -54,17 +54,46 @@ static bool debug __initdata;
>  
>  static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
>  {
> -	if (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled)
> -		return true;
> +	if (WARN_ON(!lsm->enabled))
> +		return false;
>  
> -	return false;
> +	return *lsm->enabled;
>  }
>  
>  /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag, if it exists. */
> -static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> +static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
> +static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
> +
> +static void __init default_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
>  {
> +	/* If storage location already set, skip this one. */
>  	if (lsm->enabled)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
> +	 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
> +	 */
> +	if (enabled)
> +		lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
> +	else
> +		lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
> +}
> +
> +static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> +{
> +	if (WARN_ON(!lsm->enabled))
> +		return;
> +
> +	if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
> +		if (!enabled)
> +			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
> +	} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
> +		if (enabled)
> +			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
> +	} else {
>  		*lsm->enabled = enabled;
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
> @@ -127,6 +156,35 @@ static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static void __init parse_lsm_enable(const char *str,
> +				    void (*set)(struct lsm_info *, bool),
> +				    bool enabled)
> +{
> +	char *sep, *name, *next;
> +
> +	if (!str)
> +		return;
> +
> +	sep = kstrdup(str, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	next = sep;
> +	while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
> +		struct lsm_info *lsm;
> +
> +		for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> +			if (strcmp(name, "all") == 0 ||
> +			    strcmp(name, lsm->name) == 0)
> +				set(lsm, enabled);
> +		}
> +	}
> +	kfree(sep);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init prepare_lsm_enable(void)
> +{
> +	/* Prepare defaults. */
> +	parse_lsm_enable("all", default_enabled, true);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * security_init - initializes the security framework
>   *
> @@ -143,6 +201,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>  	     i++)
>  		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
>  
> +	/* Figure out which LSMs are enabled and disabled. */
> +	prepare_lsm_enable();
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
>  	 */
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-01 21:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-25  0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35   ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25       ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01  1:01         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23     ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47   ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:20       ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53           ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22   ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46   ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:27     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48       ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57             ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44           ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49             ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47   ` John Johansen
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33       ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54         ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30  2:36         ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57           ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19       ` John Johansen

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