From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 14:22:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b16a8882-4e88-0340-84b4-0fd2f8797206@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925001832.18322-17-keescook@chromium.org>
On 09/24/2018 05:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Before now, all the LSMs that did not specify an "enable" variable in their
> struct lsm_info were considered enabled by default. This prepares to make
> LSM enabling more explicit. For all LSMs without an explicit "enable"
> variable, a hard-coded storage location is chosen, and all LSMs without
> an external "enable" state have their state explicitly set to "enabled".
>
> This code appears more complex than it needs to be (comma-separated
> list parsing and "set" function parameter) because its use will be
> expanded on in the following patches to provide more explicit enabling.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> security/security.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 056b36cf6245..a8107d54b3d3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -54,17 +54,46 @@ static bool debug __initdata;
>
> static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
> {
> - if (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled)
> - return true;
> + if (WARN_ON(!lsm->enabled))
> + return false;
>
> - return false;
> + return *lsm->enabled;
> }
>
> /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag, if it exists. */
> -static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> +static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
> +static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
> +
> +static void __init default_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> {
> + /* If storage location already set, skip this one. */
> if (lsm->enabled)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
> + * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
> + */
> + if (enabled)
> + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
> + else
> + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
> +}
> +
> +static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> +{
> + if (WARN_ON(!lsm->enabled))
> + return;
> +
> + if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
> + if (!enabled)
> + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
> + } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
> + if (enabled)
> + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
> + } else {
> *lsm->enabled = enabled;
> + }
> }
>
> /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
> @@ -127,6 +156,35 @@ static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
> }
> }
>
> +static void __init parse_lsm_enable(const char *str,
> + void (*set)(struct lsm_info *, bool),
> + bool enabled)
> +{
> + char *sep, *name, *next;
> +
> + if (!str)
> + return;
> +
> + sep = kstrdup(str, GFP_KERNEL);
> + next = sep;
> + while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
> + struct lsm_info *lsm;
> +
> + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> + if (strcmp(name, "all") == 0 ||
> + strcmp(name, lsm->name) == 0)
> + set(lsm, enabled);
> + }
> + }
> + kfree(sep);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init prepare_lsm_enable(void)
> +{
> + /* Prepare defaults. */
> + parse_lsm_enable("all", default_enabled, true);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_init - initializes the security framework
> *
> @@ -143,6 +201,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> i++)
> INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
>
> + /* Figure out which LSMs are enabled and disabled. */
> + prepare_lsm_enable();
> +
> /*
> * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
> */
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-01 21:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
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