From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:48:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b19b3b96-db17-4ed7-890c-be174b21f391@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260610114137.3749027-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
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On 10.06.26 13:41, Michael Bommarito wrote:
> pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the
> backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size
> bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A
> malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING
> and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation.
>
> req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so
> a range check on the signed value is insufficient on its own: a backend
> req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes the >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING
> test, and indexes bedata->rsp[-1], an out-of-bounds write to the left of
> the array. Declare req_id as u32 and add the range check so both ends of
> the index are covered.
>
> The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a
> classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends
> against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments).
> Reject responses whose req_id is out of range.
>
> Fixes: 235a71c53903 ("xen/pvcalls: implement release command")
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
> Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
> ---
> drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c
> index 50ce4820f7eeb..78bd4e894b32e 100644
> --- a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c
> +++ b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c
> @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pvcalls_front_event_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
> struct pvcalls_bedata *bedata;
> struct xen_pvcalls_response *rsp;
> uint8_t *src, *dst;
> - int req_id = 0, more = 0, done = 0;
> + u32 req_id = 0;
> + int more = 0, done = 0;
>
> if (dev == NULL)
> return IRQ_HANDLED;
> @@ -185,6 +186,12 @@ static irqreturn_t pvcalls_front_event_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
> rsp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&bedata->ring, bedata->ring.rsp_cons);
>
> req_id = rsp->req_id;
> + if (req_id >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING) {
> + /* Malicious or buggy backend: req_id out of range. */
Please add an error message here, using pr_err_once().
Instead of just ignoring such responses, I'd consider stopping communication
with the backend for this device.
Juergen
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-10 11:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-10 11:41 Michael Bommarito
2026-06-10 11:48 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2026-06-10 11:50 ` Michael Bommarito
2026-06-10 12:19 ` Jürgen Groß
2026-06-17 1:41 ` [PATCH v2] " Michael Bommarito
2026-06-26 11:52 ` Juergen Gross
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