From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752014AbdJXRh1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Oct 2017 13:37:27 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:55724 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751536AbdJXRhR (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Oct 2017 13:37:17 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 4349AC045768 Authentication-Results: ext-mx08.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx08.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=brdeoliv@redhat.com From: "Bruno E. O. Meneguele" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com, james.l.morris@oracle.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, rusty@rustcorp.com.au, jeyu@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:37:01 -0200 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.32]); Tue, 24 Oct 2017 17:37:17 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE. This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param). Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e4ab8ef8016e..d11a7fcc5c8b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -356,12 +356,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ -#endif return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; -- 2.13.6