From: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 12:49:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b6585727108669e0c85e7871575c7700d69b5f5d.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181016145901.GA8811@embeddedor.com>
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On Tue, 2018-10-16 at 16:59 +0200, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
> ucm_cmd_table.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Thanks, applied to for-rc.
--
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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Key fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-16 16:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-16 14:59 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-10-16 16:49 ` Doug Ledford [this message]
2018-10-18 8:13 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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