From: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
To: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net>,
linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/6] um: introduce pidfd_mmap()/pidfd_munmap() syscalls
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:20:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b7681544269644a65e2f64a96a00cdb86ed04d37.camel@sipsolutions.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260710205324.1343217-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> (sfid-20260710_225357_064327_367AF1B5)
On Fri, 2026-07-10 at 13:53 -0700, Cong Wang wrote:
> This RFC adds two syscalls, pidfd_mmap() and pidfd_munmap(), that let a
> supervisor install or remove a mapping in another process's address space
> without target-side cooperation, and converts User Mode Linux to use them.
Seems simple enough, but I can't really comment on it.
> As this is an RFC, the UML side _intentionally_ does not handle host
> portability: it assumes a host kernel that provides pidfd_mmap() and
> deliberately omits any detection or fallback for older hosts (which would
> otherwise pick the ptrace path, or fail the seccomp probe). That belongs
> in a non-RFC version and is left out here to keep the series focused on
> demonstrating the impact on UML.
Makes sense for the RFC, but I think the fallback to seccomp as-is might
be useful still, we did see some benefit of seccomp and cannot
necessarily update the host kernels _that_ quickly. Maybe do that only
if forced by the user with seccomp=insecure or something, not pick it
with =auto and fail with seccomp=on if it's not available? That'd be
good enough for us, and not really leave a potential security trap (that
we have now for people who don't read the docs ;) ).
johannes
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-21 11:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-10 20:53 Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] pidfd: add " Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] um: acquire a stub pidfd via CLONE_PIDFD in seccomp mode Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] um: install guest mappings via pidfd_mmap() " Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] um: forbid mmap/munmap in the stub seccomp filter Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] um: install guest mappings via pidfd_mmap() in both modes Cong Wang
2026-07-10 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] selftests/pidfd: add pidfd_mmap()/pidfd_munmap() tests Cong Wang
2026-07-21 11:20 ` Johannes Berg [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=b7681544269644a65e2f64a96a00cdb86ed04d37.camel@sipsolutions.net \
--to=johannes@sipsolutions.net \
--cc=anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com \
--cc=benjamin@sipsolutions.net \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-um@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=richard@nod.at \
--cc=xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®