From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
To: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>,
HORIGUCHI NAOYA <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/memory-failure: don't allow to unpoison hw corrupted page
Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 19:50:43 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b7b64c37-5326-de61-8c8e-efba38f9b207@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220604103229.3378591-1-pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
On 2022/6/4 18:32, zhenwei pi wrote:
> Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft
> poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page
> puts page back buddy only, this leads BUG during accessing on the
> corrupted KPTE.
>
> Do not allow to unpoison hardware corrupted page in unpoison_memory()
> to avoid BUG like this:
>
> Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234
> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000
> #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
> #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
> PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062
> Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G M OE 5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...
> RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10
> Code: ...
> RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000
> RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000
> RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276
> R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001
> FS: 00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> PKRU: 55555554
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> prep_new_page+0x151/0x170
> get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20
> ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0
> ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
> __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340
> __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40
> vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280
> __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0
> handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0
> do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680
> ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50
> exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170
> asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
>
Thanks for fixing this issue.
> Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
> ---
> mm/memory-failure.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
> index b85661cbdc4a..ec49571924f4 100644
> --- a/mm/memory-failure.c
> +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
> @@ -2090,6 +2090,7 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
> {
> struct page *page;
> struct page *p;
> + pte_t *kpte;
> int ret = -EBUSY;
> int freeit = 0;
> static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
> @@ -2101,6 +2102,13 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
> p = pfn_to_page(pfn);
> page = compound_head(p);
>
> + kpte = virt_to_kpte((unsigned long)page_to_virt(p));
> + if (kpte && !pte_present(*kpte)) {
It seems this bug is specified to x86? IIUC, not all arch will unmap the entire page if the
whole page is affected and poisoned. So the above virt_to_kpte + !pte_present check could not
detect the hardware corrupted page reliably, i.e. if page is not *whole* unmapped, e.g. *possible*
hugetlb page, we will still unpoison a hardware corrupted page. Or am I miss something?
> + unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Page was hardware poisoned %#lx\n",
> + pfn, &unpoison_rs);
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
I think -EOPNOTSUPP might be a better error code too as Naoya pointed out.
> mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
>
> if (!PageHWPoison(p)) {
>
Thanks!
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-07 11:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-04 10:32 zhenwei pi
2022-06-04 18:56 ` Andrew Morton
2022-06-05 4:24 ` zhenwei pi
2022-06-06 4:32 ` HORIGUCHI NAOYA(堀口 直也)
2022-06-06 7:20 ` zhenwei pi
2022-06-06 9:15 ` HORIGUCHI NAOYA(堀口 直也)
2022-06-07 12:36 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-06-07 21:59 ` Andrew Morton
2022-06-07 23:43 ` HORIGUCHI NAOYA(堀口 直也)
2022-06-08 3:06 ` zhenwei pi
2022-06-08 9:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-06-07 11:50 ` Miaohe Lin [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=b7b64c37-5326-de61-8c8e-efba38f9b207@huawei.com \
--to=linmiaohe@huawei.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=naoya.horiguchi@nec.com \
--cc=pizhenwei@bytedance.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®