mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] KVM: SVM: Save host DR masks but NOT DRs on CPUs with DebugSwap
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 08:12:48 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b958d363-962a-7927-a83a-8b80358f890a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3a1b6e1c-5a74-4c9d-81d2-7f9a34f58042@amd.com>

On 2/24/25 20:22, Kim Phillips wrote:
> On 2/18/25 7:26 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> When running SEV-SNP guests on a CPU that supports DebugSwap, always save
>> the host's DR0..DR3 mask MSR values irrespective of whether or not
>> DebugSwap is enabled, to ensure the host values aren't clobbered by the
>> CPU.
>>
>> SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE is deeply flawed in that it allows the *guest* to
>> create a VMSA with guest-controlled SEV_FEATURES.  A well behaved guest
>> can inform the hypervisor, i.e. KVM, of its "requested" features, but on
>> CPUs without ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES support, nothing prevents the guest
>> from
>> lying about which SEV features are being enabled (or not!).
>>
>> If a misbehaving guest enables DebugSwap in a secondary vCPU's VMSA, the
>> CPU will load the DR0..DR3 mask MSRs on #VMEXIT, i.e. will clobber the
>> MSRs with '0' if KVM doesn't save its desired value.
>>
>> Note, DR0..DR3 themselves are "ok", as DR7 is reset on #VMEXIT, and KVM
>> restores all DRs in common x86 code as needed via
>> hw_breakpoint_restore().
>> I.e. there is no risk of host DR0..DR3 being clobbered (when it matters).
>> However, there is a flaw in the opposite direction; because the guest can
>> lie about enabling DebugSwap, i.e. can *disable* DebugSwap without KVM's
>> knowledge, KVM must not rely on the CPU to restore DRs.  Defer fixing
>> that wart, as it's more of a documentation issue than a bug in the code.
>>
>> Note, KVM added support for DebugSwap on commit d1f85fbe836e ("KVM: SEV:
>> Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES"), but that is not an appropriate
>> Fixes,
>> as the underlying flaw exists in hardware, not in KVM.  I.e. all kernels
>> that support SEV-SNP need to be patched, not just kernels with KVM's full
>> support for DebugSwap (ignoring that DebugSwap support landed first).
>>
>> Fixes: e366f92ea99e ("KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event")
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++--
>>   1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 74525651770a..e3606d072735 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> @@ -4568,6 +4568,8 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>>     void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct
>> sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
>>   {
>> +    struct kvm *kvm = svm->vcpu.kvm;
>> +
>>       /*
>>        * All host state for SEV-ES guests is categorized into three
>> swap types
>>        * based on how it is handled by hardware during a world switch:
>> @@ -4592,9 +4594,14 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct
>> vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_are
>>       /*
>>        * If DebugSwap is enabled, debug registers are loaded but NOT
>> saved by
>>        * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the
>> CPU both
>> -     * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).
>> +     * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).  Sadly, on CPUs without
>> +     * ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, KVM can't prevent SNP guests from enabling
>> +     * DebugSwap on secondary vCPUs without KVM's knowledge via "AP
>> Create",
>> +     * and so KVM must save DRs if DebugSwap is supported to prevent DRs
>> +     * from being clobbered by a misbehaving guest.
>>        */
>> -    if (sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm)) {
>> +    if (sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm) ||
>> +        (sev_snp_guest(kvm) &&
>> cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP))) {
> 
> Both ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES and DEBUG_SWAP are also SEV-ES (not only SNP)
> features, so s/sev_snp_guest/sev_es_guest/?

Only SNP can supply a VMSA that may have a different SEV_FEATURES. For
SEV-ES, SEV_FEATURES will have been set by KVM and only KVM.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Kim

  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-25 14:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-19  1:26 [PATCH 00/10] KVM: SVM: Attempt to cleanup SEV_FEATURES Sean Christopherson
2025-02-19  1:26 ` [PATCH 01/10] KVM: SVM: Save host DR masks but NOT DRs on CPUs with DebugSwap Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 19:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25  2:22   ` Kim Phillips
2025-02-25 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-02-19  1:26 ` [PATCH 02/10] KVM: SVM: Don't rely on DebugSwap to restore host DR0..DR3 Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 20:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-24 22:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-19  1:26 ` [PATCH 03/10] KVM: SVM: Terminate the VM if a SEV-ES+ guest is run with an invalid VMSA Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 21:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-24 22:55     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 23:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25  0:54         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25  1:20           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 14:42           ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:26 ` [PATCH 04/10] KVM: SVM: Don't change target vCPU state on AP Creation VMGEXIT error Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 21:31   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 05/10] KVM: SVM: Require AP's "requested" SEV_FEATURES to match KVM's view Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 21:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 06/10] KVM: SVM: Simplify request+kick logic in SNP AP Creation handling Sean Christopherson
2025-02-19  6:19   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-24 21:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 07/10] KVM: SVM: Use guard(mutex) to simplify SNP AP Creation error handling Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 21:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 08/10] KVM: SVM: Mark VMCB dirty before processing incoming snp_vmsa_gpa Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 21:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 09/10] KVM: SVM: Use guard(mutex) to simplify SNP vCPU state updates Sean Christopherson
2025-02-24 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-19  1:27 ` [PATCH 10/10] KVM: SVM: Invalidate "next" SNP VMSA GPA even on failure Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25  0:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-20 22:51 ` [PATCH 00/10] KVM: SVM: Attempt to cleanup SEV_FEATURES Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25  0:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25  2:21     ` Kim Phillips

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=b958d363-962a-7927-a83a-8b80358f890a@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=aik@amd.com \
    --cc=kim.phillips@amd.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=naveen@kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®