From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "Christian Göttsche" <cgoettsche@seltendoof.de>, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
"Nick Desaulniers" <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
"Bill Wendling" <morbo@google.com>,
"Justin Stitt" <justinstitt@google.com>,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/14] selinux: validate symbols
Date: Wed, 06 May 2026 19:43:14 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ba12d905fe53bfee14017bc3353144af@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250511173055.406906-10-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de>
On May 11, 2025 =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> wrote:
>
> Some symbol tables need to be validated after indexing, since during
> indexing their referenced entries might not yet have been indexed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> index f8d6e993ce89..4559c8918134 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -765,6 +843,16 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
> if (rc)
> goto out;
> }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
> + if (!validate_f[i])
> + continue;
> +
> + rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, validate_f[i], p);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
Is there a reason why we need a second loop to do the validation? Can we
simply do the validation in the indexing loop above this?
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
p->table[i] = kvcalloc(...);
hashtab_map(p->table, index_f[i]);
if (validate_f[i])
hashtab_map(p->table, validate_f[i]);
}
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-06 23:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-11 17:30 [PATCH v3 01/14] selinux: avoid nontransitive comparison Christian Göttsche
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] selinux: use u16 for security classes Christian Göttsche
2025-05-13 19:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-17 21:53 ` David Laight
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] selinux: more strict policy parsing Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 14:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-14 14:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-05-06 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 3/14] " Paul Moore
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] selinux: check length fields in policies Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 17:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] selinux: validate constraints Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 17:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] selinux: pre-validate conditional expressions Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 17:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] selinux: check type attr map overflows Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 18:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-05-06 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 7/14] " Paul Moore
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] selinux: reorder policydb_index() Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 18:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-05-06 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 8/14] " Paul Moore
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] selinux: beef up isvalid checks Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 18:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] selinux: validate symbols Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 19:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-05-06 23:43 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] selinux: more strict bounds check Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 19:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-05-01 17:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] selinux: check for simple types Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 19:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] selinux: restrict policy strings Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 19:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-14 20:02 ` James Carter
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] selinux: harden MLS context string generation against overflows Christian Göttsche
2025-05-14 19:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-05-11 17:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] selinux: harden against malformed policies Christian Göttsche
2025-05-13 19:40 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] selinux: avoid nontransitive comparison Stephen Smalley
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