From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dominik Brodowski" <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Kentaro Takeda" <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 20:25:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ba40f88c-b7bb-8c2d-3282-8912209710e0@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202103161221.8291CC3E6@keescook>
On 16/03/2021 20:24, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 08:04:09PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 6:02 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>> One could argue that chroot(2) is useless without a properly populated
>>> root hierarchy (i.e. without /dev and /proc). However, there are
>>> multiple use cases that don't require the chrooting process to create
>>> file hierarchies with special files nor mount points, e.g.:
>>> * A process sandboxing itself, once all its libraries are loaded, may
>>> not need files other than regular files, or even no file at all.
>>> * Some pre-populated root hierarchies could be used to chroot into,
>>> provided for instance by development environments or tailored
>>> distributions.
>>> * Processes executed in a chroot may not require access to these special
>>> files (e.g. with minimal runtimes, or by emulating some special files
>>> with a LD_PRELOADed library or seccomp).
>>>
>>> Unprivileged chroot is especially interesting for userspace developers
>>> wishing to harden their applications. For instance, chroot(2) and Yama
>>> enable to build a capability-based security (i.e. remove filesystem
>>> ambient accesses) by calling chroot/chdir with an empty directory and
>>> accessing data through dedicated file descriptors obtained with
>>> openat2(2) and RESOLVE_BENEATH/RESOLVE_IN_ROOT/RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.
>>
>> I don't entirely understand. Are you writing this with the assumption
>> that a future change will make it possible to set these RESOLVE flags
>> process-wide, or something like that?
>
> I thought it meant "open all out-of-chroot dirs as fds using RESOLVE_...
> flags then chroot". As in, there's no way to then escape "up" for the
> old opens, and the new opens stay in the chroot.
Yes, that was the idea.
>
>> [...]
>>> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>> [...]
>>> +static inline int current_chroot_allowed(void)
>>> +{
>>> + /*
>>> + * Changing the root directory for the calling task (and its future
>>> + * children) requires that this task has CAP_SYS_CHROOT in its
>>> + * namespace, or be running with no_new_privs and not sharing its
>>> + * fs_struct and not escaping its current root (cf. create_user_ns()).
>>> + * As for seccomp, checking no_new_privs avoids scenarios where
>>> + * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
>>> + */
>>> + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && current->fs->users == 1 &&
>>
>> this read of current->fs->users should be using READ_ONCE()
>
> Ah yeah, good call. I should remember this when I think "can this race?"
> :P
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-16 19:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-16 17:01 [PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 18:43 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 19:04 ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 19:25 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2021-03-16 19:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 19:31 ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
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