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[2003:cb:c70b:7a00:9ccd:493:d8e2:9ac8]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-3825faf9829sm2094715f8f.31.2024.11.22.03.00.25 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 22 Nov 2024 03:00:26 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 12:00:25 +0100 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH] /dev/mem: Add a new parameter strict_devmem to bypass strict devmem To: Yafang Shao , Greg KH Cc: mingo@redhat.com, arnd@arndb.de, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar References: <20241120122858.22190-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com> <0aa9f3bd-b1b6-4089-b9eb-5b72d7a1541a@redhat.com> <2024112134-theater-jasmine-61f3@gregkh> From: David Hildenbrand Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; keydata= xsFNBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABzSREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT7CwZgEEwEIAEICGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQW AgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl8Ox4kFCRKpKXgACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1oHcA//a6Tj7SBNjFNM1iNhWUo1lxAja0lpSodSnB2g4FCZ4R61SBR4l/psBL73xktp rDHrx4aSpwkRP6Epu6mLvhlfjmkRG4OynJ5HG1gfv7RJJfnUdUM1z5kdS8JBrOhMJS2c/gPf wv1TGRq2XdMPnfY2o0CxRqpcLkx4vBODvJGl2mQyJF/gPepdDfcT8/PY9BJ7FL6Hrq1gnAo4 3Iv9qV0JiT2wmZciNyYQhmA1V6dyTRiQ4YAc31zOo2IM+xisPzeSHgw3ONY/XhYvfZ9r7W1l pNQdc2G+o4Di9NPFHQQhDw3YTRR1opJaTlRDzxYxzU6ZnUUBghxt9cwUWTpfCktkMZiPSDGd KgQBjnweV2jw9UOTxjb4LXqDjmSNkjDdQUOU69jGMUXgihvo4zhYcMX8F5gWdRtMR7DzW/YE BgVcyxNkMIXoY1aYj6npHYiNQesQlqjU6azjbH70/SXKM5tNRplgW8TNprMDuntdvV9wNkFs 9TyM02V5aWxFfI42+aivc4KEw69SE9KXwC7FSf5wXzuTot97N9Phj/Z3+jx443jo2NR34XgF 89cct7wJMjOF7bBefo0fPPZQuIma0Zym71cP61OP/i11ahNye6HGKfxGCOcs5wW9kRQEk8P9 M/k2wt3mt/fCQnuP/mWutNPt95w9wSsUyATLmtNrwccz63XOwU0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAHCwXwEGAEIACYCGwwWIQQb2cqtc1xMOkYN/MpN3hD3 AP+DWgUCXw7HsgUJEqkpoQAKCRBN3hD3AP+DWrrpD/4qS3dyVRxDcDHIlmguXjC1Q5tZTwNB boaBTPHSy/Nksu0eY7x6HfQJ3xajVH32Ms6t1trDQmPx2iP5+7iDsb7OKAb5eOS8h+BEBDeq 3ecsQDv0fFJOA9ag5O3LLNk+3x3q7e0uo06XMaY7UHS341ozXUUI7wC7iKfoUTv03iO9El5f XpNMx/YrIMduZ2+nd9Di7o5+KIwlb2mAB9sTNHdMrXesX8eBL6T9b+MZJk+mZuPxKNVfEQMQ a5SxUEADIPQTPNvBewdeI80yeOCrN+Zzwy/Mrx9EPeu59Y5vSJOx/z6OUImD/GhX7Xvkt3kq Er5KTrJz3++B6SH9pum9PuoE/k+nntJkNMmQpR4MCBaV/J9gIOPGodDKnjdng+mXliF3Ptu6 3oxc2RCyGzTlxyMwuc2U5Q7KtUNTdDe8T0uE+9b8BLMVQDDfJjqY0VVqSUwImzTDLX9S4g/8 kC4HRcclk8hpyhY2jKGluZO0awwTIMgVEzmTyBphDg/Gx7dZU1Xf8HFuE+UZ5UDHDTnwgv7E th6RC9+WrhDNspZ9fJjKWRbveQgUFCpe1sa77LAw+XFrKmBHXp9ZVIe90RMe2tRL06BGiRZr jPrnvUsUUsjRoRNJjKKA/REq+sAnhkNPPZ/NNMjaZ5b8Tovi8C0tmxiCHaQYqj7G2rgnT0kt WNyWQQ== Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 22.11.24 03:26, Yafang Shao wrote: > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 11:15 PM Greg KH wrote: >> >> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 10:31:12PM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote: >>> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 4:51 PM David Hildenbrand wrote: >>>> >>>> On 20.11.24 13:28, Yafang Shao wrote: >>>>> When CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is enabled, writing to /dev/mem to override >>>>> kernel data for debugging purposes is prohibited. This configuration is >>>>> always enabled on our production servers. However, there are times when we >>>>> need to use the crash utility to modify kernel data to analyze complex >>>>> issues. >>>>> >>>>> As suggested by Ingo, we can add a boot time knob of soft-enabling it. >>>>> Therefore, a new parameter "strict_devmem=" is added. The reuslt are as >>>>> follows, >>>>> >>>>> - Before this change >>>>> crash> wr panic_on_oops 0 >>>>> wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore <<<< failed >>>>> >>>>> - After this change >>>>> - default >>>>> crash> wr panic_on_oops 0 >>>>> wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore <<<< failed >>>>> >>>>> - strict_devmem=off >>>>> crash> p panic_on_oops >>>>> panic_on_oops = $1 = 1 >>>>> crash> wr panic_on_oops 0 >>>>> crash> p panic_on_oops >>>>> panic_on_oops = $2 = 0 <<<< succeeded >>>>> >>>>> - strict_devmem=invalid >>>>> [ 0.230052] Invalid option string for strict_devmem: 'invalid' >>>>> crash> wr panic_on_oops 0 >>>>> wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore <<<< failed >>>>> >>>>> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar >>>>> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao >>>>> --- >>>>> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++ >>>>> drivers/char/mem.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ >>>>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) >>>>> >>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt >>>>> index 1518343bbe22..7fe0f66d0dfb 100644 >>>>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt >>>>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt >>>>> @@ -6563,6 +6563,22 @@ >>>>> them frequently to increase the rate of SLB faults >>>>> on kernel addresses. >>>>> >>>>> + strict_devmem= >>>>> + [KNL] Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, whether strict devmem >>>>> + is enabled for this boot. Strict devmem checking is used >>>>> + to protect the userspace (root) access to all of memory, >>>>> + including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental access >>>>> + to this is obviously disastrous, but specific access can >>>>> + be used by people debugging the kernel. Note that with >>>>> + PAT support enabled, even in this case there are >>>>> + restrictions on /dev/mem use due to the cache aliasing >>>>> + requirements. >>>>> + on If IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem file only allows >>>>> + userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and data >>>>> + regions. This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all >>>>> + common users of /dev/mem. (default) >>>>> + off Disable strict devmem checks. >>>>> + >>>>> sunrpc.min_resvport= >>>>> sunrpc.max_resvport= >>>>> [NFS,SUNRPC] >>>> >>>> This will allow to violate EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM, and I am afraid I don't >>>> enjoy seeing devmem handling+config getting more complicated. >>> >>> That poses a challenge. Perhaps we should also consider disabling >>> functions that rely on EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM when strict_devmem=off, >>> but implementing such a change seems overly complex. >>> >>> Our primary goal is to temporarily bypass STRICT_DEVMEM for live >>> kernel debugging. In an earlier version, I proposed making the >>> fucntion devmem_is_allowed() error-injectable, but Ingo pointed out >>> that it violates the principles of STRICT_DEVMEM. >> >> I think that "primary goal" is the problem here. We don't want to do >> that, at all, for all the reasons why we implemented STRICT_DEVMEM and >> for why people enable it. >> >> Either you enable it because you want the protection and "security" it >> provides, or you do not. Don't try to work around it please. >> >>> Do you have any suggestions on enabling write access to /dev/mem in >>> debugging tools like the crash utility, while maintaining >>> compatibility with the existing rules? >> >> I think you just don't provide write access to /dev/mem for debugging >> tools as it's a huge security hole that people realized and have plugged >> up. If you want to provide access to this for "debugging" then just >> don't enable that option and live with the risk involved, I don't see >> how you can have it both ways. > > I don’t quite see how STRICT_DEVMEM could pose a significant security > concern. If you’re root, you already have the ability to do whatever > you want on the system if you’re determined to. This option primarily > serves to prevent reckless or accidental writes to kernel memory. > > As I understand it, STRICT_DEVMEM is more about enabling functionality > for features like page table checking and virtio_mem than about > enforcing security. If you look at the history, there were all mechanisms added way after STRICT_DEVMEM. I mean, just take a look at who relies on STRICT_DEVMEM. HARDENED_USERCOPY in security/Kconfig .. So NACK. -- Cheers, David / dhildenb