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From: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammadeftekhar@gmail.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
Subject: [BUG] KVM: nVMX: emulating SMSW/LMSW/POPF/PUSHF for L2 injects a spurious #UD (vmx_check_intercept default)
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 23:12:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bce8e397-6d8c-4816-b147-4830abafeaa9@gmail.com> (raw)

Hi,

Reporting a nested-emulation fidelity bug (correctness / KVM-vs-hardware and
VMX-vs-SVM differential; not memory-safety). It appears to be the same class
the stalled series "KVM: nVMX: Synthesize nested VM-Exit for supported
emulation intercepts" / "Consolidate missing X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED logic in L2
emulation" (v2, Jan 2025) set out to fix, which has not landed; v7.3-rc6 
still
carries the stub. Sending a concrete, reproduced list of the reachable
instructions in case it helps revive that work, and a minimal stop-gap.

The defect
----------
The x86 instruction emulator has no notion of L1 vs L2; all nested-intercept
fidelity is delegated to vmx_check_intercept() 
(arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:8190),
which is a partial stub ending in:

	/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
	default:
		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;		/* vmx.c:8272-8274 */

For an instruction VMX does NOT actually intercept, the architecturally 
correct
answer is X86EMUL_CONTINUE (let it execute), not UNHANDLEABLE. SMSW and 
LMSW are
decoded with an intercept hook (emulate.c, II() -> ctxt->intercept =
x86_intercept_smsw/_lmsw) and the hook is consulted whenever 
check_intercepts is
set, which x86.c sets precisely for L2:

	r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt, is_guest_mode(vcpu) && ...);	/* x86.c */

So for L2, SMSW reaches vmx_check_intercept() -> default -> UNHANDLEABLE 
before
em_smsw runs. UNHANDLEABLE becomes EMULATION_FAILED, 
handle_emulation_failure()
queues #UD unconditionally, and the CPL0/userspace-exit escape hatch is 
gated on
!is_guest_mode, so L2 is resumed with a spurious #UD pending. For L1
(is_guest_mode false) check_intercepts is false, em_smsw runs, and the
instruction completes. SMSW merely reads CR0[15:0] and has no VMX intercept
control, so #UD is architecturally impossible here.

Reachability: L0 only runs its emulator on an L2 instruction that faults 
to it,
i.e. a memory operand resolving to an MMIO/unbacked GPA, which L1 
controls via
EPT12. No privilege beyond running a nested guest.

Reachable instructions (reproduced, fresh VM per arm)
-----------------------------------------------------
Confirmed at runtime on BOTH vendors (Intel 7.3-rc3, AMD 7.3-rc2):

   SMSW   #UD on VMX,     clean on SVM   (II SrcNone|DstMem|Mov)
   LMSW   #UD on VMX,     clean on SVM   (II SrcMem16|Mov|Priv; also has 
a real
                                          selective-CR0 intercept to honour)
   POPF   #UD on VMX,     clean on SVM   (II ImplicitOps|Stack)
   PUSHF  hang on VMX,    clean on SVM   (store re-faults the injected 
#UD until
                                          the watchdog), clean on SVM
   IRET   fails on BOTH   -> EXCLUDED (vendor-neutral emulator 
limitation, not
                                       this bug)

The VMX-vs-SVM split is the root cause made visible: svm_check_intercept()
initialises ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE and returns it for anything the 
nested VMCB
does not actively intercept (svm.c:4852), whereas vmx_check_intercept()'s
default returns UNHANDLEABLE.

Suggested fix
-------------
The general fix is the stalled series (synthesize a nested VM-exit for
emulated-but-intercepted instructions; CONTINUE otherwise). As a minimal
stop-gap, add cases to vmx_check_intercept(): SMSW -> X86EMUL_CONTINUE (no
intercept exists); LMSW -> evaluate the nested CR0-load/selective-CR0 
intercept
and either reflect a nested VM-exit or CONTINUE; PUSHF/POPF -> CONTINUE 
(no VMX
control). SVM already models all of these.

Reproducer: an EPT12-override harness points one L2 instruction's memory 
operand
at an unbacked (MMIO) GPA and runs it; a MOV control through the same 
fault path
emulates cleanly, isolating the instruction as the sole variable. Happy 
to share
it or test patches.

Thanks,
Amirmohammad

             reply	other threads:[~2026-10-22 21:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-22 21:12 Amirmohammad Eftekhar [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-10-16 23:52 Amirmohammad Eftekhar

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