On 05.10.26 14:56, Yehyeong Lee wrote: > p9_xen_response() takes the length of an incoming response from the ring > -- the first field of the 9p header, which the Xen transport reuses as > its framing header -- and uses it to advance the consumer index, but > never checks that it is at least the header size or no larger than the > number of bytes the backend has actually produced. > > A malicious or buggy backend can post a response whose size is smaller > than the header (for example 0). The consumer index then never advances, > so the response work re-reads the same ring contents instead of making > progress. In testing this raced with the teardown that the malformed > reply triggers and dereferenced a freed p9_client: > > 9pfs 9pfs-0: Wrong req tag=ffff > BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 > #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode > #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page > PGD 0 P4D 0 > Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5 #6 PREEMPT(lazy) > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 > Workqueue: events p9_xen_response > RIP: 0010:idr_find+0x4/0x10 > RSP: 0018:ffffbf5d80063de8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa229c21195a0 RCX: ffffa229c2400000 > RDX: ffffa229c11c2200 RSI: 000000000000ffff RDI: 0000000000000050 > RBP: 000000000000ffff R08: 3fffffffffffdfff R09: ffffffffffffffff > R10: 3fffffffffffdfff R11: ffffffff87a60e80 R12: 0000000000000050 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000100000 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa22a7661c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000003ac34002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 > PKRU: 55555554 > Call Trace: > > p9_tag_lookup+0x2b/0x90 > p9_xen_response+0x17c/0x2e0 > process_one_work+0x16a/0x3a0 > worker_thread+0x172/0x2e0 > kthread+0xdd/0x110 > ret_from_fork+0x18b/0x240 > ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 > > Modules linked in: > CR2: 0000000000000060 > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > > Reject a response whose size is outside [sizeof(header), queued] before > using it, matching the validation the backend already applies to > incoming requests. > > Fixes: f66c72bea129 ("xen/9pfs: receive responses") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Juergen