From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
peterz@infradead.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
"Mehta, Sohil" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Subject: Re: Kernel Shadow Stacks Versus XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 23:00:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd608c7c-676a-4b65-97dd-626d0e8a5514@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2f0560df-69fc-4fc1-81fa-447e289ec2df@intel.com>
On 10/23/26 21:03, Dave Hansen wrote:
> So, I'm working on kernel shadow stacks. I have some nice optimization
> code like fred_update_rsp0() for SSP0. It avoids WRMSR's on exits to
> userspace if FRED_SSP0 hasn't changed, just like FRED_RSP0.
>
> Well, turns out that FRED_SSP0 isn't like FRED_RSP0 in one very
> important way: it is an alias for PL0_SSP, which is managed via
> XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL which is in:
>
> /* Supervisor features which are enabled only in guest FPUs */
> #define XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL
>
> So, I was running along just fine in my nice shadow stack kernel going
> in and out of the kernel just fine. But the first time I did an XRSTOR,
> the XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL feature got set to its init state. My SSP0 cache
> didn't notice and I tried to run userspace with SSP0=0. Much hilarity
> ensued on the next kernel entry.
>
> The most adorable part of all this is that I have KVM compiled
> completely out on my config. The "only in guest FPUs" code is biting me
> on a kernel that can't even run guests.
If you want to quickly work around for your !CONFIG_KVM kernel, I would do
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
/* Supervisor features which are enabled only in guest FPUs */
#define XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL
#else
#define XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR 0
#endif
and a small adjustment like
BUILD_BUG_ON((XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED |
XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED) &
~XFEATURES_INIT_FPSTATE_HANDLED);
That will get rid of the bit in XSS.
> Any thoughts on what we should do?
>
> Actually context switching XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL seems kinda silly in a
> lot of ways. PL0_SSP can always be derived _and_ it isn't actually even
> needed at context switch time, only when running userspace.
True but, just to understand, what is the performance like if you
actually use XSAVES/XRSTORS to update SSP0 on context switches instead
of WRMSR+cache? Hopefully the microcode does a bunch of optimizations
as well.
> I could just aggressively blow away my SSP0 cache any time an XRSTOR
> touches XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL. That would be easy. But it also seems silly
> that XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL is being blown away at _all_ during normal
> context switches. Heck, it goes further than that because:
>
> fpregs_restore_userregs() does:
>
> restore_fpregs_from_fpstate(fpu->fpstate,
> XFEATURE_MASK_FPSTATE);
>
> Where XFEATURE_MASK_FPSTATE contains XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED.
The actual mask used by restore_fpregs_from_fpstate is tighter though,
it's "fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSTATE".
Can you replace fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features with some fpstate->xyz
(sorry too late to think it through :)) that has CET_KERNEL for the
guest FPU and not for the regular one?
> So a "restore_userregs" function is blowing away supervisor state.
>
> IOW, I think we're using XFEATURE_MASK_FPSTATE a bit too broadly.
>
> I'd like to get to a place where only the KVM code even has
> XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL in its RFBM.
That I agree, but I think it can be handled in
{save,restore}_fpregs_to_fpstate().
Paolo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-23 21:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-23 19:03 Dave Hansen
2026-10-23 21:00 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2026-10-23 21:21 ` Dave Hansen
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