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From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>,
	Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v5 5/6] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES
Date: Tue, 9 May 2023 12:58:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <be291727-052a-7e0c-64a0-0950e1c8b44c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230411125718.2297768-6-aik@amd.com>

> Prior to SEV-ES, KVM saved/restored host debug registers upon switching
> to/from a VM. Changing those registers inside a running SEV VM
> triggered #VMEXIT to KVM.
> 
> SEV-ES added encrypted state (ES) which uses an encrypted page
> for the VM state (VMSA). The hardware saves/restores certain registers
> on VMRUN/VMEXIT according to a swap type (A, B, C), see
> "Table B-3. Swap Types" in the AMD Architecture Programmer’s Manual
> volume 2.
> 
> The DR6 and DR7 registers have always been swapped as Type A for SEV-ES
> guests, but a new feature is available, identified via
> CPUID Fn8000001F_EAX[14] "DebugSwap for SEV-ES guests", that provides
> support for swapping additional debug registers. DR[0-3] and
> DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK are swapped as Type B when SEV_FEATURES[5] (DebugSwap)
> is set.
> 
> Enable DebugSwap for a VMSA but only do so if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0]
> ("NoNestedDataBp", "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints") is
> supported by the SOC as otherwise a malicious SEV-ES guest can set up
> data breakpoints on the #DB IDT entry/stack and cause an infinite loop.

You mean #DB => #BP here?

> Set the features bit in sev_es_sync_vmsa() which is the last point
> when VMSA is not encrypted yet as sev_(es_)init_vmcb() (where the most
> init happens) is called not only when VCPU is initialized but also on
> intrahost migration when VMSA is encrypted.
> 
> Eliminate DR7 and #DB intercepts as:
> - they are not needed when DebugSwap is supported;
> - #VC for these intercepts is most likely not supported anyway and
> kills the VM.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> Changes:
> v8:
> * added CPUID's DebugSwap feature
> * commit log, comments updated
> * redid the whole thing
> 
> v4:
> * removed sev_es_is_debug_swap_enabled() helper
> * made sev_es_debug_swap_enabled (module param) static
> * set sev_feature early in sev_es_init_vmcb() and made intercepts
>    dependend on it vs. module param
> * move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c
> 
> v3:
> * rewrote the commit log again
> * rebased on tip/master to use recently defined X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP
> * s/boot_cpu_has/cpu_feature_enabled/
> 
> v2:
> * debug_swap moved from vcpu to module_param
> * rewrote commit log
> 
> ---
> Tested with:
> ===
> int x;
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
>          x = 1;
>          return 0;
> }
> ===
> gcc -g a.c
> rsync a.out ruby-954vm:~/
> ssh -t ruby-954vm 'gdb -ex "file a.out" -ex "watch x" -ex r'
> 
> where ruby-954vm is a VM.
> 
> With "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/debug_swap = 0", gdb does not stop
> on the watchpoint, with "= 1" - gdb does.
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
>   arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h         |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             | 36 ++++++++++++++++++--
>   3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index d9c190cdefa9..3a5eeb178778 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -435,6 +435,7 @@
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX		(19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
>   
>   /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 770dcf75eaa9..3a422d213010 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
>   #define AVIC_HPA_MASK	~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
>   #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK		0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
>   
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
>   
>   struct vmcb_seg {
>   	u16 selector;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index f0885250252d..ba12e7962e94 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>   #include <asm/pkru.h>
>   #include <asm/trapnr.h>
>   #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
> +#include <asm/debugreg.h>
>   
>   #include "mmu.h"
>   #include "x86.h"
> @@ -53,9 +54,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
>   static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
> +
> +/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
> +static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
> +module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   #else
>   #define sev_enabled false
>   #define sev_es_enabled false
> +#define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
>   #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
>   
>   static u8 sev_enc_bit;
> @@ -605,6 +611,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>   	save->xss  = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
>   	save->dr6  = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
>   
> +	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
> +		save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
> +
>   	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
>   	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
>   
> @@ -2256,6 +2265,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   out:
>   	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
>   	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
> +	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
> +	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
> +		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
>   #endif
>   }
>   
> @@ -2976,14 +2988,20 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>   	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
>   
>   	/*
> +	 * Unless DebugSwap (depends on X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) is enabled,
>   	 * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest to disallow
>   	 * the guest kernel enable debugging as otherwise a VM writing to DR7
>   	 * from the #DB handler may trigger infinite loop of #DB's.
>   	 */
>   	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
> -	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> -	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> -	recalc_intercepts(svm);
> +	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
> +		clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
> +		/* clr_exception_intercept() called recalc_intercepts() */
> +	} else {
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> +		recalc_intercepts(svm);
> +	}
>   
>   	/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
>   	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
> @@ -3048,6 +3066,18 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
>   
>   	/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
>   	hostsa->xss = host_xss;
> +
> +	/* The DebugSwap SEV feature does Type B swaps of DR[0-3] */
> +	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
> +		hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
> +		hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
> +		hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
> +		hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
> +		hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
> +		hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
> +		hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
> +		hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)


  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-09 10:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-11 12:57 [PATCH kernel v5 0/6] KVM: SEV: Enable AMD SEV-ES DebugSwap Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 1/6] KVM: SEV: move set_dr_intercepts/clr_dr_intercepts from the header Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 2/6] KVM: SEV: Move SEV's GP_VECTOR intercept setup to SEV Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 3/6] KVM: SEV-ES: explicitly disable debug Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-22 22:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 4/6] KVM: SVM/SEV/SEV-ES: Rework intercepts Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-22 22:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 5/6] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-09 10:58   ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2023-05-10  9:35     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-05-22 23:39   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-23 11:33     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-23 15:44       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-26  3:16         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-26 14:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-30  8:57             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-01 23:31               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-13 23:19                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-14  3:58                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-14 21:27                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-11 12:57 ` [PATCH kernel v5 6/6] x86/sev: Do not handle #VC for DR7 read/write Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-22 23:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24  6:36     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-04-20  1:49 ` [PATCH kernel v5 0/6] KVM: SEV: Enable AMD SEV-ES DebugSwap Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-04-20 14:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-19  0:19     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-05-19 15:28       ` Sean Christopherson

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