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[71.126.255.178]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id af79cd13be357-93f1a1b882asm359713685a.42.2026.10.16.20.00.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 16 Oct 2026 20:00:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 23:00:10 -0400 Message-ID: From: Paul Moore To: Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] lsm/lsm-pr-20261016 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Linus, Sixteen LSM framework patches for the Linux v7.4 merge window: - Add LSM hooks, object blobs, and audit records for namespaces Add the necessary bits to enable LSMs to enforce access controls on the management of various kernel namespaces. While this pull request does not contain any in-tree users of these hooks, the Landlock pull request for Linux v7.4 will include Landlock support and the next merge window will likely include SELinux support as well. Considering the development behind these hooks, I expect that BPF LSM developers will also be making use of the namespace hooks, if they haven't already. - Update the inode LSM hooks to include mount idmaps This allows LSMs to incorporate the mount ID mapping into their access control decisions. While there are no current in-tree users of this, it was requested by those developing BPF LSM programs and this pull request includes a BPF LSM selftest. - Preserve the full 32-bit ioctl command in LSM audit records Previously only the low 16 bits were logged, ignoring the direction and size information in the upper 16 bits. The pull request also includes a Landlock based selftest to verify the full 32-bit ioctl value. - Ensure we don't call security_backing_file_free() multiple times Thankfully we don't have a problem with the current code base, but we want to fix this behavior now before it becomes a problem. - Clarify that only the current task may access current->cred The current code is a bit misleading around safely accessing the cred field in a task struct. Through comment and code corrections, this pull request clarifies that only the task itself may access its cred field. - Add SLAB_NO_MERGE to the credential object cache Harden the credential cache by ensuring credential objects live on dedicated slab pages. - Make use of safe memory zero'ing in the LSM Rust bindings - Update the docs for the current behavior of /sys/kernel/security/lsm - Update the docs for CONFIG_LSM and the "lsm=" command line option - Remove unnecessary code Paul -- The following changes since commit fd73f4a6659897191fa0d40695fe370925dd3780: Linux 7.3-rc3 (2026-09-13 14:38:02 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git tags/lsm-pr-20261016 for you to fetch changes up to 881f19c2ffbc73f351b257e09c71e6059939b770: lsm: remove redundant NULL check in security_init() (2026-09-29 21:47:20 -0400) ---------------------------------------------------------------- lsm/stable-7.4 PR 20261016 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Benno Lossin (1): rust: lsm: replace `core::mem::zeroed` with `pin_init::zeroed` Cai Xinchen (2): lsm: delete duplicate assignment in lsm_prepare() lsm: don't call security_backing_file_free() multiple times Christian Brauner (2): ns: Free anonymous mount namespaces via ns_common_free() lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces Daan De Meyer (2): lsm: expose mount idmaps to inode hooks selftests/bpf: verify mount idmaps reach inode hooks Jann Horn (1): cred: clarify that task_struct::cred is only for the current task Lincoln Wallace (2): doc: describe CONFIG_LSM and lsm= as the selection mechanism doc: fix LSM ordering description for /sys/kernel/security/lsm Mickaël Salaün (3): lsm: add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records lsm: Preserve full ioctl commands in audit records selftests/landlock: Check full ioctl commands in audit records Mohammed EL Kadiri (1): cred: prevent slab cache merging for cred_jar Paul Moore (1): lsm: update the BUILD_BUG_ON() in audit_log_lsm_data() Sang-Heon Jeon (1): lsm: remove redundant NULL check in security_init() Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 20 - fs/cachefiles/security.c | 4 fs/namei.c | 18 - fs/namespace.c | 3 include/linux/cred.h | 17 - include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 7 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 26 - include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 3 include/linux/sched.h | 8 include/linux/security.h | 78 +++- include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 1 init/init_task.c | 2 kernel/auditsc.c | 5 kernel/cred.c | 5 kernel/nscommon.c | 17 - kernel/nsproxy.c | 6 rust/kernel/security.rs | 3 security/lsm_audit.c | 8 security/lsm_init.c | 9 security/security.c | 115 +++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 - security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c | 231 ++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 79 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 10 26 files changed, 599 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-) -- paul-moore.com