From: Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas.dufresne@collabora.com>
To: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>,
hverkuil@kernel.org, mchehab@kernel.org
Cc: sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com, laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com,
detlev.casanova@collabora.com, kees@kernel.org,
michael.bommarito@gmail.com, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] media: v4l2-ctrls: validate AV1 ref_frame_idx and primary_ref_frame
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 16:51:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c1a5c4b339077cb6ecb0e7727eabdc2039fdfb03.camel@collabora.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709131211.44425-1-doruk@0sec.ai>
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Le jeudi 09 juillet 2026 à 15:12 +0200, Doruk Tan Ozturk a écrit :
> The stateless AV1 frame control V4L2_CID_STATELESS_AV1_FRAME carries
> ref_frame_idx[V4L2_AV1_REFS_PER_FRAME] (signed, -128..127) and
> primary_ref_frame (__u8), both copied from userspace. validate_av1_frame()
> already checks flags, quantization, segmentation, loop filter, CDEF, loop
> restoration and superres, but never bounds these reference indices.
>
> Decoders use them directly as array subscripts. In the MediaTek decoder
> vdec_av1_slice_setup_ref() does:
>
> int ref_idx = ctrl_fh->ref_frame_idx[i];
> pfc->ref_idx[i] = ctrl_fh->reference_frame_ts[ref_idx];
> slot_id = frame->ref_frame_map[ref_idx];
>
> indexing reference_frame_ts[8] and ref_frame_map[8] with an attacker
> controlled signed value. In the Rockchip/verisilicon decoder the CDF setup
> does:
>
> rockchip_av1_get_cdfs(ctx,
> frame->ref_frame_idx[frame->primary_ref_frame]);
>
> indexing ref_frame_idx[7] with the unbounded primary_ref_frame. Both are
> out-of-bounds reads driven by unvalidated userspace input.
>
> Validate in the core, like the other AV1 frame fields, so every decoder is
> covered: reject ref_frame_idx entries outside
> [0, V4L2_AV1_TOTAL_REFS_PER_FRAME) and primary_ref_frame >=
> V4L2_AV1_TOTAL_REFS_PER_FRAME. The upper bound still permits the value 7
> (PRIMARY_REF_NONE), which decoders handle explicitly.
>
> Found by 0sec's autonomous vulnerability analysis (https://0sec.ai).
> Found by static analysis; not yet runtime-reproduced (Rockchip/MediaTek SoC
> hardware required).
>
> Fixes: 9de30f579980 ("media: Add AV1 uAPI")
> Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4.8
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> ---
> v2: wrap a quoted decoder line in the commit message to satisfy checkpatch
> (<=75 cols); no code change from v1.
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20260628134105.21001-1-doruk@0sec.ai/
>
> drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c
> index ba047d7d8601..5096c48ea402 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c
> +++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c
> @@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ static int validate_av1_film_grain(struct v4l2_ctrl_av1_film_grain *fg)
> static int validate_av1_frame(struct v4l2_ctrl_av1_frame *f)
> {
> int ret = 0;
> + u32 i;
>
> ret = validate_av1_quantization(&f->quantization);
> if (ret)
> @@ -836,6 +837,14 @@ static int validate_av1_frame(struct v4l2_ctrl_av1_frame *f)
> if (f->superres_denom > GENMASK(2, 0) + 9)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(f->ref_frame_idx); i++)
> + if (f->ref_frame_idx[i] < 0 ||
> + f->ref_frame_idx[i] >= V4L2_AV1_TOTAL_REFS_PER_FRAME)
> + return -EINVAL;
This is likely a breaking changes, and since you didn't test it I'm being very
cautious. Through code inspection, I see that GStreamer will fill the
ref_frame_idx to value -1 when reference is unused. This happens notably on
every keyframe.
> +
> + if (f->primary_ref_frame >= V4L2_AV1_TOTAL_REFS_PER_FRAME)
> + return -EINVAL;
As per spec, this shouldn't be bigger then AV1_PRIMARY_REF_NONE (7). But it does
seems that passing values above can cause issues in
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_prob() notably.
Nicolas
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-28 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-09 13:12 Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-09-28 20:51 ` Nicolas Dufresne [this message]
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