From: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
To: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"kernel@pengutronix.de" <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [EXT] [PATCH v9 3/7] crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:07:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c22218d5-e6d0-8bb8-f129-427c69bdb1f3@nxp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6fb4414da896cbac68332ae34eab5081@walle.cc>
On 5/11/2022 2:54 PM, Michael Walle wrote:
> Am 2022-05-11 12:28, schrieb Horia Geantă:
>
>>>>>> For non-E variants, it might happen that Blob protocol is enabled,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> number of AES CHA are zero.
>>>>>> If the output of below expression is > 0, then only blob_present
>>>>>> should be marked present or true.
>>>>>> For era > 10, you handled. But for era < 10, please add the below
>>>>>> code.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are there any CAAMs which can be just enabled partially for era <
>>>>> 10?
>>>>> I didn't found anything. To me it looks like the non-export
>>>>> controlled
>>>>> CAAM is only available for era >= 10. For era < 10, the CAAM is
>>>>> either
>>>>> fully featured there or it is not available at all and thus the node
>>>>> is removed in the bootloader (at least that is the case for
>>>>> layerscape).
>>>>>
>>>> Qouting from our previous discussion in U-boot:
>>>> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/patch/20200602150904.1997-1-michael@walle.cc/#2457448
>>>>
>>>> "
>>>> Based on previous (NXP-internal) discussions, non-E crypto module is:
>>>> -fully disabled on: LS1021A (ARMv7), LS1043A, LS1088A, LS2088A
>>>> (and their personalities)
>>>> -partially [*] disabled on: LS1012A, LS1028A, LS1046A, LX2160A
>>>> (and their personalities)
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>> From the partially disabled list, LS1028A and LX2160A have CAAM Era
>>>> 10,
>>>> while LS1012A and LS1046A integrate CAAM Era 8.
>>>
>>> Thanks for clarification. Do you know it that is a layerscape feature?
>>> I had a look at the imx8mn which have a era 9 and it doesn't have the
>>> PKHA_VERSION register which indicates the partially disabled PKHA
>>> block. Thus I concluded that there is no partially disabled feature
>>> on era < 10.
>>>
>> Unfortunately when moving from Era 9 to Era 10, the register map
>> is not 100% backwards-compatible.
>> This is why you're not seeing PKHA_VERSION register for i.MX8MN.
>>
>> For Era >= 10, the CHA version and CHA number fields are conveniently
>> found
>> found in the same *_VERSION register, e.g. PKHA_VID and PKHA_NUM are
>> both
>> located in PKHA_VERSION.
>>
>> For Era < 10, these fields are scattered:
>> CHAVID_LS[PKVID]
>> CHANUM_LS[PKNUM]
>
> Ok, but there is only the number of instances. I couldn't find a
> similar bit to the PKHA_VERSION[PKHA_MISC[7]] bit, which indicates
> PKHA decryption/encryption capability is disabled. That seems to
> be only for era >= 10, right? That was what caused my confusion,
Yes, there's no corresponding information for PKHA_MISC on CAAM versions
earlier than Era 10.
Only starting with Era 10 PKHA can be _partially_ disabled on non-E CAAM.
> because until now I was under the impression that non-E variants
> will always have that bit.
>
> Rereading your comment, you don't mention PKHA at all. So for
> era <10 if you blow the EXPORT_CONTROL fuse, you'll have zero
> in any *NUM except for MDNUM, RNGNUM and CRCNUM. Is that correct?
>
Partially true.
For some SoCs, CAAM does not support CRCA at all, irrespective of the state
of the fuse.
> In that case, I agree, we should also check CHANUM_LS[AESNUM] for
> era < 10.
>
Btw, newer manuals have the subsection
"SEC/ CAAM implementation" -> "SEC/CAAM Versions with Encryption Disabled"
which details what happens in case encryption is disabled.
Horia
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-12 7:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-06 6:25 [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-09 12:39 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-05-09 13:04 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 9:16 ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-05-11 9:21 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 9:21 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-11 9:48 ` Horia Geantă
2022-05-11 9:59 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-11 10:28 ` Horia Geantă
2022-05-11 11:54 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-12 7:07 ` Horia Geantă [this message]
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-07 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-07 19:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 10:48 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 15:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 17:13 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-06 10:52 ` [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Michael Walle
2022-05-11 10:47 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 11:29 ` Michael Walle
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