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From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 16:53:12 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c5bebf0b-9667-5725-2800-97c5a85635c4@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180514100639.v3erlzbuv2e4awfh@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>

On 14.05.2018 13:06, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 12:35:25PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>> On 14.05.2018 08:15, Mark Rutland wrote:
>>> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 11:40:07AM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>>>> So what would you think if I do the following in check_alloca():
>>>>
>>>> 	if (size >= stack_left) {
>>>> #if !defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK)
>>>> 		panic("alloca over the kernel stack boundary\n");
>>>> #else
>>>> 		BUG();
>>>> #endif
>>>
>>> Given this is already out-of-line, how about we always use panic(), regardless
>>> of VMAP_STACK and SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK? i.e. just
>>>
>>> 	if (unlikely(size >= stack_left))
>>> 		panic("alloca over the kernel stack boundary");
>>>
>>> If we have VMAP_STACK selected, and overflow during the panic, it's the same as
>>> if we overflowed during the BUG(). It's likely that panic() will use less stack
>>> space than BUG(), and the compiler can put the call in a slow path that
>>> shouldn't affect most calls, so in all cases it's likely preferable.
>>
>> I'm sure that maintainers and Linus will strongly dislike my patch if I always
>> use panic() here. panic() kills the whole kernel and we shouldn't use it when we
>> can safely continue to work.
>>
>> Let me describe my logic. So let's have size >= stack_left on a thread stack.
>>
>> 1. If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, we can safely use BUG(). Even if BUG()
>> handling overflows the thread stack into the guard page, handle_stack_overflow()
>> is called and the neighbour memory is not corrupted. The kernel can proceed to live.
> 
> On arm64 with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, a stack overflow will result in a
> panic(). My understanding was that the same is true on x86.

No, x86 CONFIG_VMAP_STACK only kills the offending process. I see it on my deep
recursion test, the kernel continues to live. handle_stack_overflow() in
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c calls die().

>> 2. If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is disabled, BUG() handling can corrupt the neighbour
>> kernel memory and cause the undefined behaviour of the whole kernel. I see it on
>> my lkdtm test. That is a cogent reason for panic().
> 
> In this case, panic() can also corrupt the neighbour stack, and could
> also fail.
> 
> When CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not selected, a stack overflow simply cannot
> be handled reliably -- while panic() may be more likely to succeed, it
> is not gauranteed to.
>
>> 2.a. If CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK is enabled, the kernel already does panic()
>> when STACK_END_MAGIC is corrupted. So we will _not_ break the safety policy if
>> we do panic() in a similar situation in check_alloca().
> 
> Sure, I'm certainly happy with panic() here.

Ok!

>> 2.b. If CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK is disabled, the user has some real reasons
>> not to do panic() when the kernel stack is corrupted. 
> 
> I believe that CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK is seen as a debug feature,
> and hence people don't select it. 

I see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK enabled by default in Ubuntu config...

> I strongly doubt that people have
> reasons to disable it other than not wanting the overhead associated
> with debug features.

I think it's not a question of performance here. There are cases when a system
must live as long as possible (even partially corrupted) and must not die
entirely. Oops is ok for those systems, but panic (full DoS) is not.

> I think it is reasonable to panic() here even with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
> selected.

It's too tough for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK on x86 - the system can proceed to live.
Anyway, the check_alloca() code will not be shared between x86 and arm64, I've
described the reasons in this thread. So I can have BUG() for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
on x86 and Laura can consistently use panic() on arm64.

>> So we should not do it in check_alloca() as well, just use BUG() and
>> hope for the best.
> 
> Regardless of whether we BUG() or panic(), we're hoping for the best.
> 
> Consistently using panic() here will keep things simpler, so any failure
> reported will be easier to reason about, and easier to debug.

Let me keep BUG() for !CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK. I beware of using panic()
by default, let distro/user decide this. I remember very well how I was shouted
at, when this one was merged:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6fa91b93630396ca220c33dd38ffc62686d499


Mark, I'm really grateful to you for such a nice code review!
Alexander

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-14 13:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-06 14:22 [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 1/6] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2018-04-16 18:29   ` Kees Cook
2018-04-18 18:33     ` Laura Abbott
2018-04-18 18:50     ` Dave Hansen
2018-04-24  1:03       ` Kees Cook
2018-04-24  4:23   ` Dave Hansen
2018-04-30 23:48     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02  8:42       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 12:38         ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 12:39           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 12:51             ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 21:02               ` Kees Cook
2018-05-06 10:04                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 3/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33   ` [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33   ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 21:31     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 23:07       ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 23:37         ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 16:05         ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 16:45           ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03  7:19     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 11:37       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-05-03 17:33       ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 19:09         ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04  8:30           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-04 11:09         ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-06  8:22           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 15:50             ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 16:13               ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-13  8:40                 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14  5:15                   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14  9:35                     ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 10:06                       ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 13:53                         ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2018-05-14 14:07                           ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 19:00       ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04 11:16         ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 18:55 ` [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Laura Abbott
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-07-18 21:10 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-07-19  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2018-07-19 10:41   ` Alexander Popov
2018-07-19 11:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21  1:13 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 15:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 23:53     ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22  1:35       ` Laura Abbott

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