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From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
To: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>, <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	<james.morse@arm.com>, <Dave.Martin@arm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <ben.horgan@arm.com>,
	<fustini@kernel.org>, <fenghuay@nvidia.com>,
	<peternewman@google.com>, <yu.c.chen@intel.com>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <patches@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86/resctrl: Ensure domain fully initialized before placed on RCU list
Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 13:56:26 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c6bc7632-6076-4bb9-82d5-c1cf1b9e8188@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6a0a2f88-c22f-4a08-b3cd-b46e9677caba@amd.com>

Hi Babu,

On 5/28/26 12:04 PM, Babu Moger wrote:
> On 5/28/26 11:11, Reinette Chatre wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5/22/26 12:15 PM, Reinette Chatre wrote:
>>>   static void l3_mon_domain_setup(int cpu, int id, struct rdt_resource *r, struct list_head *add_pos)
>>> @@ -556,14 +554,12 @@ static void l3_mon_domain_setup(int cpu, int id, struct rdt_resource *r, struct
>>>           return;
>>>       }
>>>   -    list_add_tail_rcu(&d->hdr.list, add_pos);
>>> -
>>>       err = resctrl_online_mon_domain(r, &d->hdr);
>>>       if (err) {
>>> -        list_del_rcu(&d->hdr.list);
>>> -        synchronize_rcu();
>>>           l3_mon_domain_free(hw_dom);
>>> +        return;
>>>       }
>>> +    list_add_tail_rcu(&d->hdr.list, add_pos);
>>>   }
>>>     static void domain_add_cpu_mon(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
>>
>> I resubmitted the last three patches of series to obtain Sashiko review [1] and
>> respond to that feedback here:
>>
>> a) Sashiko: "Does this reordering expose the monitor directories to userspace before the
>>     domain is actually added to the RCU list?"
>>
>>     Yes. As pointed out by Sashiko there is a short time where the monitoring data files
>>     may be exposed to user space before the monitoring domain is added to the RCU list.
>>     Also pointed out by Sashiko, if user attempts to read from such file it will return
>>     -ENOENT.
>>
>>     This behavior looks correct and acceptable to me.
> 
> Yes. I agree,

Thank you for taking a look.

> 
>>
>> b) Sashiko: "This is a pre-existing issue, but does resctrl_find_domain() safely traverse
>>     the RCU list?
>>     Yes, this is safe because resctrl_find_domain() is run with cpus_read_lock() that ensures
>>     the list can be traversed safely because the list can only be modified with
>>     CPU write lock held.
>>     One improvement to resctrl that would help support this is to replace the "list_for_each()"
>>     domain list traversals with something like:
>>         list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, head, member, lockdep_is_cpus_held())
>>     Doing something like above would help document why such list traversal outside of
>>     RCU read-side critical section is safe.
> 
> Are you planning to make this change at this time? It appears to be a corner case, and we haven’t observed it in real-world scenarios.
> 

I am considering it, yes, and was planning to make the change first to determine the impact on this series
before deciding. This is not a functional change but instead making the code conform to best practice that
implicitly documents why it is safe to traverse the list outside of an RCU read-side critical section. I
think this would be a nice addition to resctrl. Including it in this series may actually help reviewers consider
all the flows involved in these races. Do you think this should be deferred? resctrl cleanup work is not
popular [2] ...

Reinette

[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1777419024.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-28 20:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-22 19:15 [PATCH v3 0/9] x86,fs/resctrl: Fix long-standing issues Reinette Chatre
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] fs/resctrl: Move functions to avoid forward references in subsequent fixes Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 10:06   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] fs/resctrl: Free mon_data structures on rdt_get_tree() failure Reinette Chatre
2026-05-27 15:18   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] fs/resctrl: Fix use-after-free during unmount Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28  9:45   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-28 16:09     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 13:48   ` Chen Yu
2026-05-28 16:09     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 10:11   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-29 14:06   ` Chen, Yu C
2026-05-29 15:53     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-31  8:41       ` Chen, Yu C
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] fs/resctrl: Prevent use-after-free in rdtgroup_kn_put() Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 10:51   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] fs/resctrl: Fix pseudo-locking lifetime handling Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 10:56   ` Ben Horgan
2026-05-28 16:10     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] fs/resctrl: Prevent deadlock and use-after-free in info file handlers Reinette Chatre
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] x86/resctrl: Ensure domain fully initialized before placed on RCU list Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 16:11   ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 19:04     ` Babu Moger
2026-05-28 20:56       ` Reinette Chatre [this message]
2026-05-28 23:10         ` Moger, Babu
2026-05-31  8:37     ` Chen, Yu C
2026-06-01 15:40       ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-22 19:15 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] fs/resctrl: Fix UAF from worker threads when domains are removed Reinette Chatre
2026-05-26 15:32   ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-26 17:53     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-26 18:27       ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-26 21:05         ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-26 21:26           ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-27  1:49             ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 16:12   ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-28 20:08 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] x86,fs/resctrl: Fix long-standing issues Luck, Tony
2026-05-29 18:37   ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-29 19:06     ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-29 20:19       ` Reinette Chatre

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