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From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: Nuoqi Gui <gnq25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	 Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	John Fastabend	 <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Song Liu	 <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	Jiri Olsa	 <jolsa@kernel.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Reject scalar addition from untrusted memory
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2026 10:01:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c6cf40ef2957b6b2acf8820bce10becda20d9dfd.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260609-f01-03-scalar-add-bpf-next-v1-1-e6212e274155@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>

On Tue, 2026-06-09 at 22:55 +0800, Nuoqi Gui wrote:
> scalar += rdonly_untrusted_mem reaches adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with the
> pointer as the source register. The untrusted PTR_TO_MEM case returns there
> without updating the scalar destination, leaving stale verifier state.
> 
> Reject that addition before the early return. Pointer += scalar remains
> handled by the existing untrusted-memory rule.
> 
> Fixes: f2362a57aeff ("bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()")
> Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui <gnq25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index c8d980fdd709..c6b350f9585a 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -14823,6 +14823,14 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
>  				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
>  				 */
> +				if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
> +				    base_type(src_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM &&
> +				    (src_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) {
> +					verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from %s to scalar\n",
> +						insn->dst_reg,
> +						reg_type_str(env, src_reg->type));
> +					return -EACCES;
> +				}
>  				err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
>  				if (err)
>  					return err;

Should the fix be like this:

  diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
  index 7d27ba396d32..9c85dd680a46 100644
  --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
  +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
  @@ -13593,8 +13593,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
           * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe
           * instructions, hence no need to track offsets.
           */
  -       if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED))
  +       if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) {
  +               *dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
                  return 0;
  +       }
   
          switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
          case PTR_TO_CTX:

Instead?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-09 17:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-09 14:55 [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] " Nuoqi Gui
2026-06-09 14:55 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] " Nuoqi Gui
2026-06-09 15:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-06-09 17:01   ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2026-06-09 18:21     ` Emil Tsalapatis
2026-06-10 12:16       ` Nuoqi Gui
2026-06-09 14:55 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Cover scalar addition from rdonly " Nuoqi Gui

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