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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] file capabilities: clean up setcap code
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 22:27:48 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c9c64bbdfd3f1c665f0d1b08b82f77622be701cc.1222451103.git.serue@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <178a4b5984b7559cb5cdb93b242484386ec3e3ab.1222451103.git.serue@us.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <7004aef68d149ffb4a11835f37469948496ffc18.1222451103.git.serue@us.ibm.com>

Clean up the sys_capset codepath a bit to account for the fact
that you can now not ever, never, capset on another task.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 kernel/capability.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index d39c989..92dd85b 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -132,46 +132,31 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
  * process. The net result is that we can limit our use of locks to
  * when we are reading the caps of another process.
  */
-static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
+static int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
 				     kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
 {
 	int ret;
+	struct task_struct *target;
 
-	if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
-		struct task_struct *target;
+	if (!pid || pid == task_pid_vnr(current))
+		return security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 
-		spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 
-		target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
-		if (!target)
-			ret = -ESRCH;
-		else
-			ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
+	target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+	if (!target)
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+	else
+		ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-		spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-	} else
-		ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
- * With filesystem capability support configured, the kernel does not
- * permit the changing of capabilities in one process by another
- * process. (CAP_SETPCAP has much less broad semantics when configured
- * this way.)
- */
-static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid,
-					    kernel_cap_t *effective,
-					    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-					    kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
-/*
  * Atomically modify the effective capabilities returning the original
  * value. No permission check is performed here - it is assumed that the
  * caller is permitted to set the desired effective capabilities.
@@ -293,6 +278,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
 	if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
 			   * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -310,30 +298,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
 		i++;
 	}
 
-	if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current)))
-		ret = do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid, &effective, &inheritable,
-						&permitted);
-	else {
-		/*
-		 * This lock is required even when filesystem
-		 * capability support is configured - it protects the
-		 * sys_capget() call from returning incorrect data in
-		 * the case that the targeted process is not the
-		 * current one.
-		 */
-		spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
+	/*
+	 * This lock protects the sys_capget() call from
+	 * returning incorrect data in the case that the targeted
+	 * process is not the current one.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
 
-		ret = security_capset_check(current, &effective, &inheritable,
-					    &permitted);
-		/*
-		 * Having verified that the proposed changes are
-		 * legal, we now put them into effect.
-		 */
-		if (!ret)
-			security_capset_set(current, &effective, &inheritable,
-					    &permitted);
-		spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-	}
+	ret = security_capset_check(current, &effective, &inheritable,
+				    &permitted);
+	/*
+	 * Having verified that the proposed changes are
+	 * legal, we now put them into effect.
+	 */
+	if (!ret)
+		security_capset_set(current, &effective, &inheritable,
+				    &permitted);
+	spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
 
 
 	return ret;
-- 
1.5.1.1.GIT


  reply	other threads:[~2008-09-27  2:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-09-27  2:27 [PATCH 0/6] file capabilities cleanups: introduction Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27 ` [PATCH 1/6] file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v3) Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27   ` [PATCH 2/6] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27     ` [PATCH 3/6] file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_nice Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27       ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2008-09-27  2:27         ` [PATCH 5/6] file capabilities: remove needless inline functions Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27           ` [PATCH 6/6] file capabilities: remove needless (?) bprm_clear_caps calls Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  2:27               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:39           ` [PATCH 5/6] file capabilities: remove needless inline functions Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27 13:40             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-29 21:53               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:58         ` [PATCH 4/6] file capabilities: clean up setcap code Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27 13:43           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-27  4:26       ` [PATCH 3/6] file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_nice Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-27  5:27         ` James Morris
2008-09-27  4:25     ` [PATCH 2/6] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES Andrew G. Morgan

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