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From: bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org
To: jarkko@kernel.org,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jarkko@kernel.org,bpf@vger.kernel.org,containers@lists.linux.dev,linux-api@vger.kernel.org,linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,linux-mm@kvack.org,linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,aleksa@amutable.com,alex@amutable.com,viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,luto@amacapital.net,arnd@arndb.de,brauner@kernel.org,dhowells@redhat.com,ebiggers@kernel.org,giuseppe@scrivano.org,hughd@google.com,jack@suse.cz,jlayton@kernel.org,corbet@lwn.net,josef@toxicpanda.com,kees@kernel.org,kpsingh@kernel.org,lennart@poettering.net,neal@gompa.dev,oleg@redhat.com,paul@paul-moore.com,ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com,sergeh@kernel.org,skhan@linuxfoundation.org,zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com,ast@kernel.org,andrii@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,martin.lau@kernel.org,eddyz87@gmail.com,yonghong.song@linux.dev,mason@kernel.org,ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 20:28:11 +0000 (UTC)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cac1fa0b133e15e7c67629319df17a0d25747093535aa246f44a75cb1073e2ed@mail.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-8-jarkko@kernel.org>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2669 bytes --]

> mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS

TL;DR: MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE is reported to LSMs as a plain move, so AppArmor may
mediate it as MS_MOVE rather than a bind and could allow or refuse the clone
wrongly; should LSMs be told it is a clone?

> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -3842,6 +3840,36 @@ static int do_move_mount(const struct path *old_path,
> +		if (flags & MNT_TREE_CLONE) {
> +			unsigned int copy_flags;
> +
> +			if (!check_mnt(old) || old->mnt_ns == target_mnt_ns ||
> +			    (old->mnt.mnt_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER))
> +				return -EINVAL;
> +			src_user_ns = old->mnt_ns->user_ns;
> +			copy_flags = (target_mnt_ns->user_ns != src_user_ns) ?
> +				     (CL_SLAVE | CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) :
> +				     CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE;
> +			cloned = __do_loopback(old_path, true, copy_flags);

With MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE this makes a recursive bind of old_path, but the only
LSM hook on this path is still security_move_mount(from_path, to_path) in
vfs_move_mount().  LSMs get no indication that the operation is a clone
rather than a move.

The clone branch requires check_mnt(old), so from_path is always attached
to the caller's namespace.  AppArmor's aa_move_mount() chooses between its
cases on exactly that property:

    if (!our_mnt(from_path->mnt))
        /* moving a mount detached from the namespace */
        from_path = NULL;
    ... match_mnt(profile, to_path, ..., from_path, ..., MS_MOVE, ...)

So AppArmor will evaluate this as an MS_MOVE of an attached mount at
from_path, the same check it makes for a real move.  But nothing is moved
here.  A copy of the source and of everything mounted below it is attached
at to_path, and since path_mounted() is no longer required, any directory
can be the source.

With open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) followed by move_mount(), AppArmor sees a
detached source (from_path == NULL) and applies its detached-move rules.
Can a profile that allows moving the mount at /src (an MS_MOVE rule with
/src as the source) now also clone /src, or any directory below it, into
another mount namespace?  Conversely, could a profile that only allows
detached moves refuse an operation that is equivalent to open_tree() plus
move_mount()?

Should the clone be reported to LSMs as a bind, for example through a
separate hook, a flag passed to security_move_mount(), or a call to the
bind-mount mediation?


---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/45063222848

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22 20:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-22 19:35 [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci [this message]
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen

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