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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] x86/uaccess: Don't fix up USER_DS uaccess faults to kernel addresses
Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 15:48:43 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cae3c5b69836931311f3c3c3722a05e854cd9a35.1464129798.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1464129798.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1464129798.git.luto@kernel.org>

If a uaccess in USER_DS mode faults on a kernel address, it is
reasonably like to be an exploitable bug.  Make it more obvious in
testing and make it harder to exploit in practice by letting it
OOPS.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index c1933471fce7..818cc7ffef79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default);
 static bool uaccess_fault_okay(int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
 			       unsigned long extra)
 {
+	bool is_user_ds;
+
 	/*
 	 * For uaccess, only page faults should be fixed up.  I can't see
 	 * any exploit mitigation value in OOPSing on other types of faults,
@@ -42,6 +44,22 @@ static bool uaccess_fault_okay(int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
 		      trapnr))
 		return true;  /* no good reason to OOPS. */
 
+	/*
+	 * This is a page fault, so extra contains the address we failed to
+	 * access.
+	 */
+	is_user_ds = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS);
+
+	if (unlikely(is_user_ds && extra >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)) {
+		/*
+		 * We accessed out out-of-range address with USER_DS.  Force
+		 * an OOPS: if we just warned, then an attacker could trigger
+		 * this repeatedly to learn the kernel memory layout.
+		 */
+		pr_crit("BUG: uaccess to bad address 0x%lx (missing access_ok check)\n", extra);
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 }
 
-- 
2.5.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-05-24 22:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-05-24 22:48 [PATCH 0/7] x86: uaccess hardening, easy part Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/xen: Simplify set_aliased_prot Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25  9:38   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-05-25  9:50   ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2016-06-10 22:12     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-11  9:29       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-11  9:34   ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/xen: Simplify set_aliased_prot() tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/extable: Pass error_code and an extra unsigned long to exhandlers Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/uaccess: Give uaccess faults their own handler Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/dumpstack: If addr_limit is non-default, display it Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 11:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:44     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 11:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:47     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-29 18:42       ` Boris Petkov
2016-05-29 19:08         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-30  7:40           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/uaccess: Warn on uaccess faults other than #PF Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25  9:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:42     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/uaccess: OOPS or warn on a fault with KERNEL_DS and !pagefault_disabled() Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 15:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25  3:55 ` [PATCH 0/7] x86: uaccess hardening, easy part Brian Gerst
2016-05-25 17:19   ` Kees Cook
2016-05-25 17:31 ` Kees Cook

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