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From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: "Chen Ridong" <chenridong@huaweicloud.com>,
	"Chen Ridong" <chenridong@huawei.com>,
	"Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Johannes Weiner" <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	"Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cgroup/cpuset: Skip security check for hotplug induced v1 task migration
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2026 13:27:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cc4caa18-b136-46da-aa8d-0820930b7868@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d3c226f3-dd92-40a3-95a4-3e9e5f0adeb4@huaweicloud.com>

On 3/27/26 9:39 PM, Chen Ridong wrote:
>
> On 2026/3/28 4:15, Waiman Long wrote:
>> When a CPU hot removal causes a v1 cpuset to lose all its CPUs, the
>> cpuset hotplug handler will schedule a work function to migrate tasks
>> in that cpuset with no CPU to its parent to enable those tasks to
>> continue running.
>>
>> If a strict security policy is in place, however, the task migration
>> may fail when security_task_setscheduler() call in cpuset_can_attach()
>> returns a -EACCESS error. That will mean that those tasks will have
>> no CPU to run on. The system administrators will have to explicitly
>> intervene to either add CPUs to that cpuset or move the tasks elsewhere
>> if they are aware of it.
>>
>> This problem was found by a reported test failure in the LTP's
>> cpuset_hotplug_test.sh. Fix this problem by treating this special case
>> as an exception to skip the setsched security check as it is initated
>> internally within the kernel itself instead of from user input. With that
>> patch applied, the cpuset_hotplug_test.sh test can be run successfully
>> without failure.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> Should we add a Fixes tag?

The call to security_task_setscheduler() was added a long time ago and 
the cpuset v1 task migration is more like a corner case that shouldn't 
normally happen. So I don't want to put a fixes tag that will force a 
backport to earlier stable releases.

Cheers,
Longman


      reply	other threads:[~2026-03-29 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-27 20:15 Waiman Long
2026-03-27 20:22 ` Tejun Heo
2026-03-28  1:42   ` Waiman Long
2026-03-28  1:39 ` Chen Ridong
2026-03-29 17:27   ` Waiman Long [this message]

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