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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
Date: Mon,  6 May 2024 22:30:05 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cdfe36cf9c8b6cd98eb0f32b798d5af1af95cb2c.1715059256.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1715059256.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Duplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options
in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone.  Instead just add a
reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++-----------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 25a04cda4c2c..f9797ab6b38f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2
 Mitigation control on the kernel command line
 ---------------------------------------------
 
-Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
-kernel command line.
+In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the
+current CPU.
+
+Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel
+command line with the following options:
 
 	nospectre_v1
-
-		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
-		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
-		possible in the system.
-
 	nospectre_v2
+	spectre_v2={option}
+	spectre_v2_user={option}
+	spectre_bhi={option}
 
-		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
-		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
-		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
-		to spectre_v2=off.
-
-
-        spectre_v2=
-
-		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
-		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
-		The default operation protects the kernel from
-		user space attacks.
-
-		on
-			unconditionally enable, implies
-			spectre_v2_user=on
-		off
-			unconditionally disable, implies
-		        spectre_v2_user=off
-		auto
-			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
-		        vulnerable
-
-		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
-		mitigation method at run time according to the
-		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
-		CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
-		and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
-
-		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
-		against user space to user space task attacks.
-
-		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
-		the user space protections.
-
-		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
-
-                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
-                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
-                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
-                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
-                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
-                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
-                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
-                ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
-
-		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
-		spectre_v2=auto.
-
-		In general the kernel by default selects
-		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
-		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
-		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
-		cannot be disabled.
-
-	spectre_bhi=
-
-		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
-		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
-		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
-
-		on
-			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
-			needed.
-		off
-			Disable the mitigation.
-
-For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-07  5:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-07  5:30 [PATCH v5 0/3] x86/bugs: more BHI Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-07  5:30 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-07 14:38   ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-06-26  2:21     ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-06-26  5:28       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-06-26  6:35         ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-06-27  6:36         ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-05-27 11:15   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-06-26  5:21     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-07  5:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-05-07 15:04   ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions Daniel Sneddon
2024-05-08  5:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-08 14:28       ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-05-07  5:30 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-07 14:58   ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-05-08  5:19     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-27 10:45       ` Maksim Davydov
2024-06-26  5:58         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-08 15:10   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-09  5:24     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-09  8:21       ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-20 13:12   ` Maksim Davydov
2024-05-23  1:04     ` Josh Poimboeuf

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