From: Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: aead: add service indicator flag for RFC4106 AES-GCM
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2026 15:59:41 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ce1d34d9-23f9-4d1e-b790-6af75d1555ed@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aXw9Wj19ZX6dpNHW@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 1/30/26 00:10, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 29, 2026 at 04:04:36PM -0500, jeffbarnes@linux.microsoft.com wrote:
>> From: Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@microsoft.com>
>>
>> FIPS 140 validations require a “service indicator” to positively
>> identify when an approved cryptographic service is provided. For
>> RFC4106 AES‑GCM (used by IPsec), this commit exposes a per‑request
>> indicator bit when the IV/nonce construction meets the FIPS uniqueness
>> requirement.
>>
>> Specifically, the indicator is set when the caller uses the RFC4106
>> construction with seqiv (per RFC 4106 §3), where the 32‑bit salt and
>> 64‑bit seqiv together guarantee a unique 96‑bit IV per key. This
>> meets the SP 800‑38D §8.2 uniqueness requirement for GCM.
>>
>> No ABI or uAPI changes. The flag is internal to the crypto API request
>> path and may be consumed by in‑tree callers that need to record service
>> use in a FIPS context.
>>
>> Tests:
>> - Verified that gcm(aes) requests never set the service‑indicator bit.
>> - Verified that rfc4106(gcm(aes)) requests consistently set the bit.
>> - Existing crypto self‑tests continue to pass.
>> - checkpatch.pl: no issues.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnes <jeffbarnes@microsoft.com>
> Rather than exporting this indicator, I would prefer that we just
> forbid non-compliant combinations when FIPS mode is enabled.
I don't know how to accomplish that.
SP800-38D provides two frameworks for constructing a gcm IV.
(https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf)
The first construction, described in Sec. 8.2.1, relies on deterministic
elements to achieve the uniqueness requirement in Sec. 8; the second
construction, described in Sec. 8.2.2, relies on a sufficiently long
output string from an approved RBG with a sufficient security strength.
My patch checks for an implementation of 8.2.1 via rfc4106(gcm(aes)). I
don't know how a patch could check for 8.2.1 or 8.2.2 from an externally
generated iv.
Suggestions welcome.
> Thanks,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-17 20:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-29 21:04 jeffbarnes
2026-01-30 5:10 ` Herbert Xu
2026-02-17 20:59 ` Jeff Barnes [this message]
2026-02-28 8:56 ` Herbert Xu
2026-03-01 20:41 ` Joachim Vandersmissen
2026-03-02 12:26 ` Herbert Xu
2026-03-02 21:34 ` Jeff Barnes
2026-03-02 21:51 ` Jeff Barnes
2026-03-03 3:37 ` Herbert Xu
2026-03-12 14:00 ` Jeff Barnes
2026-03-14 19:37 ` Eric Biggers
2026-03-03 15:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
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