[RFC PATCH 2/2] minstrel_ht: Mitigate BTI gadget minstrel_ht_get_expected_throughput()

[Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>]

Static analysis indicate that indirect target
minstrel_ht_get_expected_throughput() could be used as a disclosure
gadget for Intra-mode Branch Target Injection (IMBTI) and Branch History
Injection (BHI).

ASM generated by compilers indicate a construct of a typical disclosure
gadget, where an adversary-controlled register contents can be used to
transiently access an arbitrary memory location.

Although there are no known ways to exploit this, but to be on safer
side mitigate it by adding a speculation barrier.

Reported-by: Scott D. Constable <scott.d.constable@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c b/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c
index 3d91b98db099..7cf90666a865 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
 #include <linux/minmax.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
 #include "rate.h"
 #include "sta_info.h"
@@ -1999,6 +2000,14 @@ static u32 minstrel_ht_get_expected_throughput(void *priv_sta)
 	struct minstrel_ht_sta *mi = priv_sta;
 	int i, j, prob, tp_avg;
 
+	/*
+	 * Protect against IMBTI/BHI.
+	 *
+	 * Transiently executing this function with an adversary controlled
+	 * argument may disclose secrets. Speculation barrier prevents that.
+	 */
+	barrier_nospec();
+
 	i = MI_RATE_GROUP(mi->max_tp_rate[0]);
 	j = MI_RATE_IDX(mi->max_tp_rate[0]);
 	prob = mi->groups[i].rates[j].prob_avg;
-- 
2.37.3