On 16.06.22 09:31, Oleksandr wrote: > > On 16.06.22 08:37, Juergen Gross wrote: > > > Hello Juergen > >> Commit fa1f57421e0b ("xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using >> Xen grant mappings") introduced a new requirement for using virtio >> devices: the backend now needs to support the VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM >> feature. >> >> This is an undue requirement for non-PV guests, as those can be operated >> with existing backends without any problem, as long as those backends >> are running in dom0. >> >> Per default allow virtio devices without grant support for non-PV >> guests. >> >> Add a new config item to always force use of grants for virtio. >> >> Fixes: fa1f57421e0b ("xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen >> grant mappings") >> Reported-by: Viresh Kumar >> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross >> --- >> V2: >> - remove command line parameter (Christoph Hellwig) >> --- >>   drivers/xen/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ >>   include/xen/xen.h   | 2 +- >>   2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/xen/Kconfig b/drivers/xen/Kconfig >> index bfd5f4f706bc..a65bd92121a5 100644 >> --- a/drivers/xen/Kconfig >> +++ b/drivers/xen/Kconfig >> @@ -355,4 +355,13 @@ config XEN_VIRTIO >>         If in doubt, say n. >> +config XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT >> +    bool "Require Xen virtio support to use grants" >> +    depends on XEN_VIRTIO >> +    help >> +      Require virtio for Xen guests to use grant mappings. >> +      This will avoid the need to give the backend the right to map all >> +      of the guest memory. This will need support on the backend side >> +      (e.g. qemu or kernel, depending on the virtio device types used). >> + >>   endmenu >> diff --git a/include/xen/xen.h b/include/xen/xen.h >> index 0780a81e140d..4d4188f20337 100644 >> --- a/include/xen/xen.h >> +++ b/include/xen/xen.h >> @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ extern u64 xen_saved_max_mem_size; >>   static inline void xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) >>   { >> -    if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) && xen_domain()) >> +    if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT) || xen_pv_domain()) >>           platform_set(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS); > > > Looks like, the flag will be *always* set for paravirtualized guests even if > CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO disabled. > > Maybe we should clarify the check? > > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) > && xen_pv_domain()) > >     platform_set(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS); > Yes, we should. I had the function in grant-dma-ops.c in V1, and could drop the CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO dependency for that reason. I'll wait for more comments before sending V3, though. Juergen