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From: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH net 0/1] net: netdev name hash leaks kernel text base
Date: Thu,  1 Oct 2026 23:52:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1790917676.git.zcliangcn@gmail.com> (raw)

Hi,

An unprivileged user can recover the kernel text base and defeat KASLR by
timing SIOCGIFINDEX lookups for attacker-chosen nonexistent interface
names. These lookups reach dev_get_by_name_rcu() and fail with ENODEV
without requiring capabilities or changes to network devices.

dev_name_hash() passes the struct net pointer to full_name_hash() as its
salt. A missing name that hashes to the same bucket as a resident name,
such as "lo", requires an extra chain traversal and takes measurably
longer to look up. For a known kernel image, the collision pattern across
possible KASLR slides identifies the runtime address of init_net and thus
the kernel text base.

I reproduced the issue as an unprivileged user on x86-64 and arm64.
A tested reproducer is available privately to maintainers on request.

Zhengchuan Liang (1):
  net: use random salt for netdev name hash to prevent text base leak

 net/core/dev.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

-- 
2.25.1

             reply	other threads:[~2026-10-02  6:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-02  6:52 Zhengchuan Liang [this message]
2026-10-02  6:52 ` [PATCH net 1/1] net: use random salt for netdev name hash to prevent text base leak Zhengchuan Liang
2026-10-02  8:20   ` Eric Dumazet
2026-10-02 15:51     ` Linus Torvalds
2026-10-02  6:59 ` [PATCH net 0/1] net: netdev name hash leaks kernel text base netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-10-02  7:35   ` Zhengchuan Liang

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