From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 17:04:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d12fc06e-ff16-63c9-34ba-7303205b0a1d@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-19-keescook@chromium.org>
On 9/20/2018 9:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> This constructs a list of ordered LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded
> list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls,
> and major LSMs continue to initialize separately.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Do you think that this mechanism will be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate dynamically loaded security modules
in the future? While I am not personally an advocate of
dynamically loaded security modules I have been working to
ensure that I haven't done anything that would actively
interfere with someone who did.
> ---
> security/security.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 25a019cc4a2b..2541a512a0f7 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
>
> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
>
> +/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
> +#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
> +
> struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
> static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>
> @@ -41,6 +44,9 @@ char *lsm_names;
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
>
> +/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
> +static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
> +
> static bool debug __initdata;
> #define init_debug(...) \
> do { \
> @@ -74,6 +80,45 @@ static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
> }
> }
>
> +/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
> +static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
> +{
> + struct lsm_info **check;
> +
> + for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
> + if (*check == lsm)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
> +static int last_lsm __initdata;
> +static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
> +{
> + /* Ignore duplicate selections. */
> + if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
> + return;
> +
> + if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
> + return;
> +
> + ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
> + init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
> + (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled) ? "en" : "dis");
> +}
> +
> +/* Populate ordered LSMs list from hard-coded list of LSMs. */
> +static void __init prepare_lsm_order(void)
> +{
> + struct lsm_info *lsm;
> +
> + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> + if (strcmp(lsm->name, "integrity") == 0)
> + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "builtin");
> + }
> +}
> +
> /* Is an LSM allowed to be enabled? */
> static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
> {
> @@ -104,14 +149,10 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
>
> static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> {
> - struct lsm_info *lsm;
> -
> - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
> - if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) != 0)
> - continue;
> + struct lsm_info **lsm;
>
> - maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
> - }
> + for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
> + maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
> }
>
> static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
> @@ -141,6 +182,8 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
> i++)
> INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
> + ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
>
> /* Process "security=", if given. */
> if (!chosen_major_lsm)
> @@ -169,6 +212,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> loadpin_add_hooks();
>
> /* Load LSMs in specified order. */
> + prepare_lsm_order();
> ordered_lsm_init();
>
> /*
> @@ -176,6 +220,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> */
> major_lsm_init();
>
> + kfree(ordered_lsms);
> return 0;
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-21 0:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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