From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: syzbot <syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
eparis@parisplace.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, peter.enderborg@sony.com,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: general protection fault in ebitmap_destroy
Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2019 11:13:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d54c804a5d2dfd560108912094db9967db5a795b.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0000000000001a9aa0057f084a81@google.com>
On Wed, 2019-01-09 at 07:41 -0800, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit: a88cc8da0279 Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from
> Andrew)
> git tree: upstream
> console output:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1722da4f400000
> kernel config:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=edf1c3031097c304
> dashboard link:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6664500f0f18f07a5c0e
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> syz repro:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12d43580c00000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the
> commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> SELinux: failed to load policy
> sel_write_load: 238 callbacks suppressed
> SELinux: failed to load policy
> kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
> kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 9316 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #16
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
> BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:ebitmap_destroy+0x32/0xf0 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c:334
> Code: 49 89 fd 41 54 53 e8 9d e6 36 fe 4d 85 ed 0f 84 99 00 00 00 e8
> 8f e6
> 36 fe 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02
> 00 0f
> 85 98 00 00 00 49 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
> RSP: 0018:ffff88808967f5c0 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88808967f6a8 RCX: dffffc0000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff834b1081 RDI: 0000000000000008
> RBP: ffff88808967f5e0 R08: ffff8880972a8140 R09: ffffed1015cc5b90
> R10: ffffed1015cc5b8f R11: ffff8880ae62dc7b R12: ffff888099d993c0
> R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff888099d993c0 R15: ffff88808967f648
> FS: 00007f70cd9e5700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00000000015e7938 CR3: 0000000096c4a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
> sens_destroy+0x49/0xa0 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:735
> sens_read+0x25d/0x460 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1636
> policydb_read+0xed9/0x60d0 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2430
> security_load_policy+0x423/0x1830
> security/selinux/ss/services.c:2129
> sel_write_load+0x25a/0x470 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c:565
> __vfs_write+0x116/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:485
> vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549
> ksys_write+0x105/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
> __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
> __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
> __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
> do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
> Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48
> 89 f7
> 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
> f0 ff
> ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007f70cd9e4c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
> 0000000000000001
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
> RDX: 000000000000005c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f70cd9e56d4
> R13: 00000000004c720f R14: 00000000004dc9a0 R15: 00000000ffffffff
> Modules linked in:
> ---[ end trace 78ea480790940b53 ]---
> RIP: 0010:ebitmap_destroy+0x32/0xf0 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c:334
> Code: 49 89 fd 41 54 53 e8 9d e6 36 fe 4d 85 ed 0f 84 99 00 00 00 e8
> 8f e6
> 36 fe 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02
> 00 0f
> 85 98 00 00 00 49 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
> RSP: 0018:ffff88808967f5c0 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88808967f6a8 RCX: dffffc0000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff834b1081 RDI: 0000000000000008
> RBP: ffff88808967f5e0 R08: ffff8880972a8140 R09: ffffed1015cc5b90
> R10: ffffed1015cc5b8f R11: ffff8880ae62dc7b R12: ffff888099d993c0
> R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff888099d993c0 R15: ffff88808967f648
> FS: 00007f70cd9e5700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 000000000073c000 CR3: 0000000096c4a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Possible fix below
From cc9324299f32db326447a28a836c462fc16bc945 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 10:55:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index a50d625e7946..c1c31e33657a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -732,7 +732,8 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
kfree(levdatum->level);
}
kfree(datum);
--
2.20.1
>
>
> ---
> This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>
> syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate
> with
> syzbot.
> syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-09 16:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 15:41 syzbot
2019-01-09 16:13 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-01-11 1:26 ` Paul Moore
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