From: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce SM2 signature use pkey algo
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 11:15:53 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <de4fa766-0f9f-43cc-b528-4b8f9d2e828b@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Yro54bzvRZqbmCxb@kernel.org>
Hi Jarkko,
On 6/28/22 7:14 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 05:20:27PM +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
>> The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and
>> recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo
>> in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo
>> field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo
>> instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it
>> will also cause signature verification failure.
>>
>> The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms
>> are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature,
>> although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm
>> information in the signature as input.
>>
>> Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification")
>> Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
>> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
>> ---
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++---
>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> index 7c9e6be35c30..3f17ee860f89 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> @@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
>> if (ret)
>> return ret;
>>
>> - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
>> + /* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */
>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sm3", 0, 0);
>
> So, why this should not validate sig->hash_alog *to be* "sm3"?
>
> I.e. add instead guard before crypto_alloc_hash:
>
> if (strncmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) {
> /* error */
> }
> /* continue */
>
Thanks, it's reasonable and I'll take your advice.
Best regards,
Tianjia
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-28 3:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-27 9:20 Tianjia Zhang
2022-06-27 23:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-06-28 3:15 ` Tianjia Zhang [this message]
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