Re: [PATCH v1] mempool: fix min_nr exceeding the elements array after concurrent resizes

["Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" <vbabka@kernel.org>]

On 10/16/26 17:46, Harry Yoo wrote:
> [+Cc Christoph Hellwig and Vitaly Wool ]
> 
> On Fri, Oct 16, 2026 at 09:25:10AM -0400, Nickolai Zeldovich wrote:
>> mempool_resize() shrinks a pool by dropping pool->lock around every
>> free_fn() call and, once the pool holds no more than new_min_nr
>> elements, stores new_min_nr into pool->min_nr.  new_min_nr was only
>> compared against pool->min_nr before the lock was first dropped, so that
>> store assumes nothing changed meanwhile.  The kernel-doc allows
>> mempool_alloc()/mempool_free() to run while a resize is in progress and
>> the grow path also copes with concurrent resizes ("Raced, other resize
>> will do our work"), but the shrink path does not: while its lock is
>> dropped another resize may shrink the pool below new_min_nr and a third
>> one may grow it again to a size between the two, replacing
>> pool->elements with an array of exactly that size.  Storing the stale
>> new_min_nr afterwards leaves pool->min_nr larger than the elements
>> array.
>> 
>> Interleaving on a pool with min_nr = curr_nr = 10:
>> 
>>   CPU A: mempool_resize(pool, 8)
>>     takes the lock, 8 <= 10 so it shrinks: remove_element(), drops the
>>     lock, calls free_fn() and is preempted there
>>   CPU B: mempool_resize(pool, 3)
>>     completes: curr_nr = 3, min_nr = 3, elements still has 10 slots
>>   CPU B: mempool_resize(pool, 5)
>>     completes: elements = kmalloc_objs(5), min_nr = 5, curr_nr = 5
>>   CPU A: retakes the lock, 8 < curr_nr (5) is false, stores min_nr = 8
>>     while elements has 5 slots
>> 
>> Every later mempool_free() sees curr_nr < min_nr and add_element()
>> stores the returned element at elements[5], [6] and [7], past the end
>> of the 5-slot kmalloc allocation: a heap out-of-bounds write, i.e. slab
>> corruption, a KASAN report, or a crash in whichever unrelated object
>> sits next to the array.  The invariant that breaks is that pool->min_nr
>> never exceeds the size of pool->elements; every other path that changes
>> min_nr or elements keeps it.

Instead of reading all this, it was simpler for me to check what the code does.

>> An in-tree caller can hit this: fs/smb/client resizes the global
>> cifs_req_poolp from cifs_demultiplex_thread() (grow, when a TCP session
>> is created) and from clean_demultiplex_info() (shrink, when one goes
>> away).  The two are coordinated only through the atomic
>> tcpSesAllocCount, so mounts and unmounts racing on one client run the
>> resizes above concurrently; pool->free is kmem_cache_free() there and
>> the window is a preemption inside it.  The other callers
>> (block/blk-zoned.c, drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_erp.c) serialise their
>> resizes.

This is useful to know, but maybe could be also less dense.

> The bug looks valid in theory, not sure if how easily it can be
> reproduced in practice as resizing should be quite rare.
> (A bug is a bug and should be fixed, but no need to hurry in this case)

Ack.

>> The shrink path has stored new_min_nr unconditionally since
>> mempool_resize() was introduced, while the grow path has always
>> re-checked pool->min_nr after reacquiring the lock.
> 
> So it's Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") ? 
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/?id=6892188b54d484098b79b0c9813c20e543124e2d
> 
> ...from a historical commit before git era, 1da177e4c3f4.
> 
>> Re-check new_min_nr against pool->min_nr under the lock before storing
>> it.  If a concurrent resize has shrunk the pool below new_min_nr in the
>> meantime, keep that resize's min_nr (and whatever array it installed),
>> as the grow path already does; otherwise the store is unchanged.  The
>> elements the loop has already freed stay freed, which is right either
>> way because the pool's limit is now below new_min_nr.

Again too verbose IMHO.

>> Found by formal verification of mm/mempool.c against the kernel binary.
>> Reproduced with a userspace build of the affected functions in which the
>> free_fn() callback drives the interleaving above: before the fix min_nr
>> ends at 8 with a 5-slot array and the next mempool_free() writes past it
>> (AddressSanitizer heap-buffer-overflow); after the fix min_nr stays at 5
>> and the element is handed to free_fn().  Not reproduced on a running
>> kernel, where the window is a single preemption inside free_fn().

Alright.

>> Assisted-by: LLM
>> Signed-off-by: Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
>> ---
>>
>>  mm/mempool.c | 4 +++-
>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/mm/mempool.c b/mm/mempool.c
>> index cb74e718b2c6..95533e2975ce 100644
>> --- a/mm/mempool.c
>> +++ b/mm/mempool.c
>> @@ -378,7 +378,9 @@ int mempool_resize(struct mempool *pool, int new_min_nr)
>>  			pool->free(element, pool->pool_data);
>>  			spin_lock_irqsave(&pool->lock, flags);
>>  		}
>> -		pool->min_nr = new_min_nr;
>> +		/* Raced, the array may now be smaller than new_min_nr */
>> +		if (new_min_nr <= pool->min_nr)

There could be just '<' ?
The outer if uses <= but the == case only leads to an early goto out_unlock.

>> +			pool->min_nr = new_min_nr;
>>  		goto out_unlock;
>>  	}
>>  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
>> 
>> base-commit: 90201351a862182bdabfc1ad1c97b1e1b6ed5931
>> -- 
>> 2.53.0
>> 
>