Re: [PATCH] driver/virtio: Add Memory Balloon Support for SEV/SEV-ES

[David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>]

>>> For now, SEV pins guest's memory to avoid swapping or
>>> moving ciphertext, but leading to the inhibition of
>>> Memory Ballooning.
>>>
>>> In Memory Ballooning, only guest's free pages will be relocated
>>> in balloon inflation and deflation, so the difference of plaintext
>>> doesn't matter to guest.
> 
>> This seems only true if the page is zeroed, is this true here?
> 
> Sorry, I cannot figure out why the pages should be zeroed. I think
> both host kernel and guest kernel assume that the pages are not
> zeroed and will use kzalloc or manually zero them in real applications,
> which is same as non-SEV environments.

balloon_page_alloc() will not zero the memory (no __GFP_ZERO set). Only 
in some configurations (zero-on-alloc, zero-on-free), the kernel would 
do that implicitly.

So we'd eventually be leaking secrets to the untrusted hypervisor?


> I have tested in SEV-ES, reclaiming memory by balloon inflation and reuse
> them after balloon deflation both works well with the patch. Hypervisor
> can normally give the reclaimed memory from one CVM to another, or give
> back to the origin CVM.

I'll comment on your misconception of memory overcommit separately.

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb