From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, "Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] mm/slub: Fix redzoning for small allocations
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 11:13:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e2857753-210c-da73-6e43-0bbd7e0efe80@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210608183955.280836-3-keescook@chromium.org>
On 6/8/21 8:39 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> The redzone area for SLUB exists between s->object_size and s->inuse
> (which is at least the word-aligned object_size). If a cache were created
> with an object_size smaller than sizeof(void *), the in-object stored
> freelist pointer would overwrite the redzone (e.g. with boot param
> "slub_debug=ZF"):
>
> BUG test (Tainted: G B ): Right Redzone overwritten
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb
> INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200
> INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620
>
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
> Object (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8 ...@..
> Redzone (____ptrval____): 1a aa ..
> Padding (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
>
> Store the freelist pointer out of line when object_size is smaller than
> sizeof(void *) and redzoning is enabled.
>
> Additionally remove the "smaller than sizeof(void *)" check under
> CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in kmem_cache_sanity_check() as it is now redundant:
> SLAB and SLOB both handle small sizes.
>
> (Note that no caches within this size range are known to exist in the
> kernel currently.)
>
> Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> ---
> mm/slab_common.c | 3 +--
> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++---
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index a4a571428c51..7cab77655f11 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_size);
> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> static int kmem_cache_sanity_check(const char *name, unsigned int size)
> {
> - if (!name || in_interrupt() || size < sizeof(void *) ||
> - size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
> + if (!name || in_interrupt() || size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
> pr_err("kmem_cache_create(%s) integrity check failed\n", name);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index f91d9fe7d0d8..f58cfd456548 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -3734,15 +3734,17 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
> */
> s->inuse = size;
>
> - if (((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
> - s->ctor)) {
> + if ((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
> + ((flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) && s->object_size < sizeof(void *)) ||
> + s->ctor) {
> /*
> * Relocate free pointer after the object if it is not
> * permitted to overwrite the first word of the object on
> * kmem_cache_free.
> *
> * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
> - * destructor or are poisoning the objects.
> + * destructor, are poisoning the objects, or are
> + * redzoning an object smaller than sizeof(void *).
> *
> * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
> * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-11 9:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-08 18:39 [PATCH v4 0/3] Actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning Kees Cook
2021-06-08 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slub: Clarify verification reporting Kees Cook
2021-06-08 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] mm/slub: Fix redzoning for small allocations Kees Cook
2021-06-11 9:13 ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2021-06-08 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] mm/slub: Actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning Kees Cook
2021-06-08 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2021-06-08 23:11 ` Kees Cook
2021-06-08 20:53 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] " Andrew Morton
2021-06-08 23:08 ` Kees Cook
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