From: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
To: 김민서 <neck3922@gmail.com>, miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [BUG] fuse: KASAN slab-use-after-free in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring()
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 18:03:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e456a62c-1b5f-4634-bbb4-cc3f02a04ea7@bsbernd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFmvuTW=gntFCBtuHGAu7caC9FM4Ovf_r1ng5gmy6djn9ziLqg@mail.gmail.com>
On 6/1/26 10:28, 김민서 wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I am reporting a FUSE-over-io_uring bug reproduced on upstream v7.1-rc6
> with KASAN enabled. The bug was found with a local syzkaller setup.
>
> Target file: fs/fuse/dev_uring.c
> Subsystem: FUSE
> Git tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
> Git head: e43ffb69e0438cddd72aaa30898b4dc446f664f8
> Kernel release: v7.1-rc6
>
> Observed crash:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring+0x20b/0x230
>
> The same issue was also observed on v7.1-rc5:
>
> Git head: e7ae89a0c97ce2b68b0983cd01eda67cf373517d
>
> Root cause analysis:
>
> The crash appears to be caused by a lifetime/state mismatch between
> struct fuse_req and the FUSE io_uring ring entry state machine.
>
> The KASAN report shows that the affected object is a struct fuse_req from
> the fuse_request cache. It is allocated in the FUSE open path via
> fuse_request_alloc() and freed later in the same open path via
> fuse_put_request(), but it is subsequently accessed from
> fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() while FUSE io_uring is sending a request to the
> userspace ring.
>
> The preceding warning in fuse_ring_ent_set_commit() also shows an unexpected
> ring entry state:
>
> WARNING: fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:865
> fuse: qid=0 commit_id 4 state 3
>
> My current guess is that an error/teardown/commit-and-fetch sequence may
> leave a stale fuse_req reachable from the FUSE io_uring ring/request queues.
>
> Reproducer:
>
> C reproducer:
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/neck392/linux-kernel-bug-reports/main/fuse-uring-uaf-v7.1-rc6/repro_fuse_uring_uaf_userns.c
>
> Full symbolized console log:
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/neck392/linux-kernel-bug-reports/main/fuse-uring-uaf-v7.1-rc6/clean_userns_report_rc6.txt
>
> Kernel config:
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/neck392/linux-kernel-bug-reports/main/fuse-uring-uaf-v7.1-rc6/kernel-config-v7.1-rc6.config
>
> Key config options:
>
> CONFIG_FUSE_FS=y
> CONFIG_FUSE_IO_URING=y
> CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH=y
> CONFIG_IO_URING=y
> CONFIG_KASAN=y
> CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y
> CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA_INFO=y
> CONFIG_USER_NS=y
>
> Runtime conditions:
>
> fuse.enable_uring=1
> unprivileged user namespaces enabled
> /dev/fuse accessible to the reproducer
>
> I verified the C reproducer by running it as uid 1000; it then creates a
> user namespace. In my minimal QEMU rootfs, /dev/fuse was chmod 0666 before
> running the reproducer because the device node is root:root 0600 by default.
>
> Without a user namespace, uid 1000 can open /dev/fuse in this setup but
> mount(fuse) fails with EPERM, so the provided reproducer uses CLONE_NEWUSER.
>
> Brief KASAN excerpt:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring+0x20b/0x230
> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009ecc698 by task repro_minimal_u/153
>
> Allocated by task 153:
> fuse_request_alloc
> fuse_get_req
> __fuse_simple_request
> fuse_send_open
> fuse_file_open
> fuse_do_open
> fuse_dir_open
> do_dentry_open
> vfs_open
> path_openat
> do_file_open
> do_sys_openat2
> __x64_sys_openat
>
> Freed by task 153:
> fuse_put_request
> __fuse_simple_request
> fuse_send_open
> fuse_file_open
> fuse_do_open
> fuse_dir_open
> do_dentry_open
> vfs_open
> path_openat
> do_file_open
> do_sys_openat2
> __x64_sys_openat
>
> If you fix this issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>
> Reported-by: Minseo Kim <neck3922@gmail.com>
>
> If you need anything else, please let me know.
>
> Best regards,
> Minseo Kim
There had been reported races already and I had sent out the fixes as
"[PATCH v2 0/4] fuse: Fix several io-uring race conditions" on
2026-05-19 to security@kernel.org. Given you posted a reproducer to a
public list, I can send out to the pulic list now.
Thanks,
Bernd
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-01 16:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-01 8:28 김민서
2026-06-01 16:03 ` Bernd Schubert [this message]
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