From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B983CC04AB4 for ; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:25:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C4732085A for ; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:25:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="soBldPES" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726246AbfENQZk (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 May 2019 12:25:40 -0400 Received: from aserp2130.oracle.com ([141.146.126.79]:34746 "EHLO aserp2130.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725980AbfENQZk (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 May 2019 12:25:40 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp2130.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp2130.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x4EGELEW097729; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:24:56 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=subject : to : cc : references : from : message-id : date : mime-version : in-reply-to : content-type : content-transfer-encoding; s=corp-2018-07-02; bh=JCV/HzgrZlCHVmf/0Cx/bB8oSFM3Re9RwssBEXXRqZc=; b=soBldPESLpJww1uCH2gLsnSanFFjMUy/AlTjGJ9OkUBv6qJNOBHy1+fFhi9hJQ+737dg tJf1MiPoFlWIpy0YVR8DtCOFPhvOWKt9vq3A+pMsKfAp2/IrfcFJyalxALp0aBrMK8zw gK0Up3guxWE/N1DTXoY/dX4xyFMkqwJvXCLgZXEWJRyRtyyjWHFMWUJNb41TIEqsxH/0 f4TnwL3Mz8fw8pQtfsmFPuZfY8FzdgkuyR/aIyrQagKrFxi/TddxfozWkPVdMnsH9b3W 9/at8r4tPmHvEJJCoB+XTRDj7rUeAVaRHDwKsE2Zo7YSQPS6SLOJrGD1faWqvlfcZkQP YQ== Received: from userp3020.oracle.com (userp3020.oracle.com [156.151.31.79]) by aserp2130.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2sdkwdqhdg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 14 May 2019 16:24:56 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (userp3020.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp3020.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x4EGNc90005562; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:24:55 GMT Received: from aserv0121.oracle.com (aserv0121.oracle.com [141.146.126.235]) by userp3020.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2sdnqjnh3e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 14 May 2019 16:24:55 +0000 Received: from abhmp0020.oracle.com (abhmp0020.oracle.com [141.146.116.26]) by aserv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id x4EGOqDm006383; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:24:52 GMT Received: from [10.166.106.34] (/10.166.106.34) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Tue, 14 May 2019 09:24:52 -0700 Subject: Re: [RFC KVM 18/27] kvm/isolation: function to copy page table entries for percpu buffer To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra , Paolo Bonzini , Radim Krcmar , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Dave Hansen , kvm list , X86 ML , Linux-MM , LKML , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com, Liran Alon , Jonathan Adams References: <1557758315-12667-1-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> <1557758315-12667-19-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> <20190514070941.GE2589@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> <4e7d52d7-d4d2-3008-b967-c40676ed15d2@oracle.com> From: Alexandre Chartre Organization: Oracle Corporation Message-ID: Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 18:24:48 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=9256 signatures=668686 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1905140114 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=9256 signatures=668686 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1905140114 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 5/14/19 5:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 2:42 AM Alexandre Chartre > wrote: >> >> >> On 5/14/19 10:34 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> >>> >>>> On May 14, 2019, at 1:25 AM, Alexandre Chartre wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 5/14/19 9:09 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: >>>>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 11:18:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:39 AM Alexandre Chartre >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> pcpu_base_addr is already mapped to the KVM address space, but this >>>>>>> represents the first percpu chunk. To access a per-cpu buffer not >>>>>>> allocated in the first chunk, add a function which maps all cpu >>>>>>> buffers corresponding to that per-cpu buffer. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also add function to clear page table entries for a percpu buffer. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This needs some kind of clarification so that readers can tell whether >>>>>> you're trying to map all percpu memory or just map a specific >>>>>> variable. In either case, you're making a dubious assumption that >>>>>> percpu memory contains no secrets. >>>>> I'm thinking the per-cpu random pool is a secrit. IOW, it demonstrably >>>>> does contain secrits, invalidating that premise. >>>> >>>> The current code unconditionally maps the entire first percpu chunk >>>> (pcpu_base_addr). So it assumes it doesn't contain any secret. That is >>>> mainly a simplification for the POC because a lot of core information >>>> that we need, for example just to switch mm, are stored there (like >>>> cpu_tlbstate, current_task...). >>> >>> I don’t think you should need any of this. >>> >> >> At the moment, the current code does need it. Otherwise it can't switch from >> kvm mm to kernel mm: switch_mm_irqs_off() will fault accessing "cpu_tlbstate", >> and then the page fault handler will fail accessing "current" before calling >> the kvm page fault handler. So it will double fault or loop on page faults. >> There are many different places where percpu variables are used, and I have >> experienced many double fault/page fault loop because of that. > > Now you're experiencing what working on the early PTI code was like :) > > This is why I think you shouldn't touch current in any of this. > >> >>>> >>>> If the entire first percpu chunk effectively has secret then we will >>>> need to individually map only buffers we need. The kvm_copy_percpu_mapping() >>>> function is added to copy mapping for a specified percpu buffer, so >>>> this used to map percpu buffers which are not in the first percpu chunk. >>>> >>>> Also note that mapping is constrained by PTE (4K), so mapped buffers >>>> (percpu or not) which do not fill a whole set of pages can leak adjacent >>>> data store on the same pages. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> I would take a different approach: figure out what you need and put it in its >>> own dedicated area, kind of like cpu_entry_area. >> >> That's certainly something we can do, like Julian proposed with "Process-local >> memory allocations": https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/11/22/1240 >> >> That's fine for buffers allocated from KVM, however, we will still need some >> core kernel mappings so the thread can run and interrupts can be handled. >> >>> One nasty issue you’ll have is vmalloc: the kernel stack is in the >>> vmap range, and, if you allow access to vmap memory at all, you’ll >>> need some way to ensure that *unmap* gets propagated. I suspect the >>> right choice is to see if you can avoid using the kernel stack at all >>> in isolated mode. Maybe you could run on the IRQ stack instead. >> >> I am currently just copying the task stack mapping into the KVM page table >> (patch 23) when a vcpu is created: >> >> err = kvm_copy_ptes(tsk->stack, THREAD_SIZE); >> >> And this seems to work. I am clearing the mapping when the VM vcpu is freed, >> so I am making the assumption that the same task is used to create and free >> a vcpu. >> > > vCPUs are bound to an mm but not a specific task, right? So I think > this is wrong in both directions. > I know, that was yet another shortcut for the POC, I assume there's a 1:1 mapping between a vCPU and task, but I think that's fair with qemu. > Suppose a vCPU is created, then the task exits, the stack mapping gets > freed (the core code tries to avoid this, but it does happen), and a > new stack gets allocated at the same VA with different physical pages. > Now you're toast :) On the flip side, wouldn't you crash if a vCPU is > created and then run on a different thread? Yes, that's why I have a safety net: before entering KVM isolation I always check that the current task is mapped in the KVM address space, if not it gets mapped. > How important is the ability to enable IRQs while running with the KVM > page tables? > I can't say, I would need to check but we probably need IRQs at least for some timers. Sounds like you would really prefer IRQs to be disabled. alex.