From: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [DISCUSSION] kstack offset randomization: bugs and performance
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:21:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e6648d05-7290-47a3-97b7-43152c71aa38@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aRyppb8PCxFKVphr@zx2c4.com>
On 18/11/2025 17:15, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 05:47:05PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 17, 2025, at 12:31, Ryan Roberts wrote:
>>> On 17/11/2025 11:30, Ryan Roberts wrote:
>>>> Hi All,
>>>>
>>>> Over the last few years we had a few complaints that syscall performance on
>>>> arm64 is slower than x86. Most recently, it was observed that a certain Java
>>>> benchmark that does a lot of fstat and lseek is spending ~10% of it's time in
>>>> get_random_u16(). Cue a bit of digging, which led me to [1] and also to some new
>>>> ideas about how performance could be improved.
>>
>>
>>>> I believe this helps the mean latency significantly without sacrificing any
>>>> strength. But it doesn't reduce the tail latency because we still have to call
>>>> into the crng eventually.
>>>>
>>>> So here's another idea: Could we use siphash to generate some random bits? We
>>>> would generate the secret key at boot using the crng. Then generate a 64 bit
>>>> siphash of (cntvct_el0 ^ tweak) (where tweak increments every time we generate a
>>>> new hash). As long as the key remains secret, the hash is unpredictable.
>>>> (perhaps we don't even need the timer value). For every hash we get 64 bits, so
>>>> that would last for 10 syscalls at 6 bits per call. So we would still have to
>>>> call siphash every 10 syscalls, so there would still be a tail, but from my
>>>> experiements, it's much less than the crng:
>>
>> IIRC, Jason argued against creating another type of prng inside of the
>> kernel for a special purpose.
>
> Yes indeed... I'm really not a fan of adding bespoke crypto willynilly
> like that. Let's make get_random_u*() faster. If you're finding that the
> issue with it is the locking, and that you're calling this from irq
> context anyway, then your proposal (if I read this discussion correctly)
> to add a raw_get_random_u*() seems like it could be sensible. Those
> functions are generated via macro anyway, so it wouldn't be too much to
> add the raw overloads. Feel free to send a patch to my random.git tree
> if you'd like to give that a try.
Thanks Jason; that's exactly what I did, and it helps. But I think ultimately
the get_random_uXX() slow path is too slow; that's the part that causes the tail
latency problem. I doubt there are options for speeding that up?
Anyway, I'm currently prototyping a few options and getting clear performance
numbers. I'll be back in a couple of days and we can continue the discussion in
light of the data.
Thanks,
Ryan
>
> Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-18 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <66c4e2a0-c7fb-46c2-acce-8a040a71cd8e@arm.com>
2025-11-17 11:31 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 16:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-17 17:23 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-17 17:46 ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 23:04 ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-11-18 17:15 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-18 17:21 ` Ryan Roberts [this message]
2025-11-18 17:28 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-17 20:27 ` Kees Cook
2025-11-18 10:28 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:25 ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-18 12:16 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-18 11:05 ` Mark Rutland
2025-11-17 20:56 ` Jeremy Linton
2025-11-18 11:05 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 14:36 ` Will Deacon
2025-11-24 17:11 ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 17:50 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-24 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2025-11-25 11:14 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-26 22:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27 8:00 ` Kees Cook
2025-11-27 11:50 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 12:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-27 14:09 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2025-11-24 19:08 ` Will Deacon
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